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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 11:29:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-80670 — perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80670</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;machine__resolve() accesses env-&amp;gt;cpu[al-&amp;gt;cpu].socket_id after checking
al-&amp;gt;cpu &amp;gt;= 0 and env-&amp;gt;cpu != NULL, but without validating al-&amp;gt;cpu
against env-&amp;gt;nr_cpus_avail.  Since al-&amp;gt;cpu comes from the untrusted
perf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an
out-of-bounds heap read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() which validates both NULL and bounds.
Also bounds-check al-&amp;gt;cpu before the cast to struct perf_cpu (int16_t):
without this, values like 65536 silently truncate to 0, bypassing the
accessor&amp;#39;s internal check and returning CPU 0&amp;#39;s topology.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;machine__resolve() accesses env-&amp;gt;cpu[al-&amp;gt;cpu].socket_id after checking
al-&amp;gt;cpu &amp;gt;= 0 and env-&amp;gt;cpu != NULL, but without validating al-&amp;gt;cpu
against env-&amp;gt;nr_cpus_avail.  Since al-&amp;gt;cpu comes from the untrusted
perf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an
out-of-bounds heap read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() which validates both NULL and bounds.
Also bounds-check al-&amp;gt;cpu before the cast to struct perf_cpu (int16_t):
without this, values like 65536 silently truncate to 0, bypassing the
accessor&amp;#39;s internal check and returning CPU 0&amp;#39;s topology.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80670</guid>
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