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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:10:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-80584 — s390/qeth: validate user buffer length in SNMP and ARP query ioctls</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80584</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;s390/qeth: validate user buffer length in SNMP and ARP query ioctls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;qeth_snmp_command() and qeth_l3_arp_query() allocate a buffer sized by
a user-supplied length (udata_len) without checking a lower bound, then
set udata_offset to a fixed non-zero value and pass both to a reply
callback. The callback bounds-checks the copy with&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((udata_len - udata_offset) &amp;lt; len)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both fields are u32, so a udata_len smaller than udata_offset makes the
subtraction wrap and the check pass, and the following memcpy() writes
past the allocation. A udata_len of 0 also yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR from
kzalloc(), which the existing NULL check does not catch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject buffers smaller than udata_offset before allocating, so the
callback subtraction can no longer underflow.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;s390/qeth: validate user buffer length in SNMP and ARP query ioctls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;qeth_snmp_command() and qeth_l3_arp_query() allocate a buffer sized by
a user-supplied length (udata_len) without checking a lower bound, then
set udata_offset to a fixed non-zero value and pass both to a reply
callback. The callback bounds-checks the copy with&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((udata_len - udata_offset) &amp;lt; len)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both fields are u32, so a udata_len smaller than udata_offset makes the
subtraction wrap and the check pass, and the following memcpy() writes
past the allocation. A udata_len of 0 also yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR from
kzalloc(), which the existing NULL check does not catch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject buffers smaller than udata_offset before allocating, so the
callback subtraction can no longer underflow.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80584</guid>
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