https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 16:12:35 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-84714 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7</p> <p>A flaw was found in the automation-controller input-validation guard sanitize_jinja(). The function uses two regular expressions to reject user-supplied Jinja, but the patterns stop at the first interior &#39;}&#39; or &#39;%&#39; character, so a Jinja expression containing an inner brace (for example an empty dict) is accepted while remaining valid Jinja. Because sanitize_jinja() is the sole guard on several launch-time fields — ad-hoc command module_args, Machine-credential username / become_method / become_user, and inventory host names — a low-privileged user can inject Jinja that ansible-core evaluates in the execution environment. This enables execution of arbitrary commands in the execution environment (bypassing an administrator&#39;s AD_HOC_COMMANDS module allowlist) and disclosure of secrets belonging to credentials the attacker cannot read (by templating a co-attached credential&#39;s injected environment variables), across the credential access-control boundary.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7</p> <p>A flaw was found in the automation-controller input-validation guard sanitize_jinja(). The function uses two regular expressions to reject user-supplied Jinja, but the patterns stop at the first interior &#39;}&#39; or &#39;%&#39; character, so a Jinja expression containing an inner brace (for example an empty dict) is accepted while remaining valid Jinja. Because sanitize_jinja() is the sole guard on several launch-time fields — ad-hoc command module_args, Machine-credential username / become_method / become_user, and inventory host names — a low-privileged user can inject Jinja that ansible-core evaluates in the execution environment. This enables execution of arbitrary commands in the execution environment (bypassing an administrator&#39;s AD_HOC_COMMANDS module allowlist) and disclosure of secrets belonging to credentials the attacker cannot read (by templating a co-attached credential&#39;s injected environment variables), across the credential access-control boundary.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-84714