<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 07:39:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-80675 — libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80675</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The loader verifies map-&amp;gt;sha against the metadata hash in its
instructions. map-&amp;gt;sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is
called on the frozen map.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map
is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just
omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can
mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to
move on with map-&amp;gt;sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The loader verifies map-&amp;gt;sha against the metadata hash in its
instructions. map-&amp;gt;sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is
called on the frozen map.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map
is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just
omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can
mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to
move on with map-&amp;gt;sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80675</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
