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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 06:57:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-78069 — Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Missing authorization on Apps controller delegation chain in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21,…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-78069</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; j2commerce.com J2Store extension for Joomla&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Missing authorization on Apps controller delegation chain in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - `J2StoreControllerApps`&amp;#39;s `appTask` delegation path instantiates app-plugin controllers with no ACL check anywhere in the code. It currently returns 403 only as a side effect of `fof.xml`&amp;#39;s wildcard-deny resolving under the singularised ACL key `app`, which has no explicit allow rule — not because of any deliberate check. Behind that path, `applocalizationdata::getInstallerTool()` used a caller-influenced table name with no allow-list, both to select a `#__j2store_*` table for truncation and to build a path to SQL files it then executes — a path-traversal-capable file read/execute.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; j2commerce.com J2Store extension for Joomla&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Missing authorization on Apps controller delegation chain in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - `J2StoreControllerApps`&amp;#39;s `appTask` delegation path instantiates app-plugin controllers with no ACL check anywhere in the code. It currently returns 403 only as a side effect of `fof.xml`&amp;#39;s wildcard-deny resolving under the singularised ACL key `app`, which has no explicit allow rule — not because of any deliberate check. Behind that path, `applocalizationdata::getInstallerTool()` used a caller-influenced table name with no allow-list, both to select a `#__j2store_*` table for truncation and to build a path to SQL files it then executes — a path-traversal-capable file read/execute.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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