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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 05:34:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-89785 — fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read of INDEX_ROOT in reparse/objid init</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89785</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read of INDEX_ROOT in reparse/objid init&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_reparse_init() and ntfs_objid_init() parse the index root of the
$Extend/$Reparse and $Extend/$ObjId metafiles (the INDEX_ROOT attributes
named $R and $O). They read its type and rule fields through
resident_data(), which does not check that the resident attribute is
large enough to hold them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mi_enum_attr() accepts a resident attribute with data_off == asize and
data_size == 0. For such an attribute placed last in its MFT record,
resident_data() returns a pointer to the end of the record_size buffer,
so reading root-&amp;gt;type / root-&amp;gt;rule reads past the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use resident_data_ex(attr, sizeof(struct INDEX_ROOT)) and bail out when
it returns NULL, as ntfs_security_init() already does for $SDH / $SII.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attribute is only parsed while mounting a crafted image, so this
needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ntfs_reparse_init (fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:2306)
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801219dc00 by task mount
  ntfs_reparse_init (fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:2306)
  ntfs_fill_super (fs/ntfs3/super.c:1604)
  get_tree_bdev_flags (fs/super.c:1703)
  vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1758)
  path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4131)
  __x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4360)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read of INDEX_ROOT in reparse/objid init&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_reparse_init() and ntfs_objid_init() parse the index root of the
$Extend/$Reparse and $Extend/$ObjId metafiles (the INDEX_ROOT attributes
named $R and $O). They read its type and rule fields through
resident_data(), which does not check that the resident attribute is
large enough to hold them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mi_enum_attr() accepts a resident attribute with data_off == asize and
data_size == 0. For such an attribute placed last in its MFT record,
resident_data() returns a pointer to the end of the record_size buffer,
so reading root-&amp;gt;type / root-&amp;gt;rule reads past the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use resident_data_ex(attr, sizeof(struct INDEX_ROOT)) and bail out when
it returns NULL, as ntfs_security_init() already does for $SDH / $SII.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attribute is only parsed while mounting a crafted image, so this
needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ntfs_reparse_init (fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:2306)
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801219dc00 by task mount
  ntfs_reparse_init (fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:2306)
  ntfs_fill_super (fs/ntfs3/super.c:1604)
  get_tree_bdev_flags (fs/super.c:1703)
  vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1758)
  path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4131)
  __x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4360)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89785</guid>
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