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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 10:01:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89621 — HID: mcp2221: validate report size in mcp2221_raw_event()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89621</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HID: mcp2221: validate report size in mcp2221_raw_event()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mcp2221_raw_event() never validates the size of incoming HID reports.
In the MCP2221_I2C_GET_DATA path it trusts the device-supplied data[3]
as the copy length without checking that 4 + data[3] bytes actually
exist in the received report. A malicious or misbehaving USB device can
send a short report with a large data[3], causing the memcpy to read
past the valid report data in the HID transfer buffer and leak
uninitialized kernel memory back to userspace through the I2C/SMBus
read path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a minimum size check at entry and validate that the source range
fits within the received report before the copy.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HID: mcp2221: validate report size in mcp2221_raw_event()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mcp2221_raw_event() never validates the size of incoming HID reports.
In the MCP2221_I2C_GET_DATA path it trusts the device-supplied data[3]
as the copy length without checking that 4 + data[3] bytes actually
exist in the received report. A malicious or misbehaving USB device can
send a short report with a large data[3], causing the memcpy to read
past the valid report data in the HID transfer buffer and leak
uninitialized kernel memory back to userspace through the I2C/SMBus
read path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a minimum size check at entry and validate that the source range
fits within the received report before the copy.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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