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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 17:55:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-98061 — bpf: Reject tail calls directly from callback frames</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98061</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Reject tail calls directly from callback frames&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A tail call from a non-zero frame is modeled as a return from that frame.
The verifier makes R0 unknown and calls prepare_func_exit() for the taken
branch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the current frame is a synchronous callback, prepare_func_exit()
enforces the callback return-value contract and marks R0 precise. Since the
tail-call path synthesized R0 rather than deriving it from an instruction,
precision backtracking reaches the callback-calling instruction with R0
still requested and triggers the &amp;#34;callback unexpected regs&amp;#34; verifier bug.
A CAP_BPF task can therefore cause a WARN and an -EFAULT BPF_PROG_LOAD.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tail calls reachable from callbacks are already rejected later by
check_max_stack_depth(). Reject a tail call made directly by a callback
before constructing the inconsistent return state, using the existing
diagnostic. Tail calls from ordinary subprograms keep their current
behavior.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Reject tail calls directly from callback frames&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A tail call from a non-zero frame is modeled as a return from that frame.
The verifier makes R0 unknown and calls prepare_func_exit() for the taken
branch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the current frame is a synchronous callback, prepare_func_exit()
enforces the callback return-value contract and marks R0 precise. Since the
tail-call path synthesized R0 rather than deriving it from an instruction,
precision backtracking reaches the callback-calling instruction with R0
still requested and triggers the &amp;#34;callback unexpected regs&amp;#34; verifier bug.
A CAP_BPF task can therefore cause a WARN and an -EFAULT BPF_PROG_LOAD.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tail calls reachable from callbacks are already rejected later by
check_max_stack_depth(). Reject a tail call made directly by a callback
before constructing the inconsistent return state, using the existing
diagnostic. Tail calls from ordinary subprograms keep their current
behavior.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98061</guid>
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