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      <title>CVE-2026-75583 — keeper.sh Calendar version prior to 2.18.14 SSRF Guard Bypass via DNS Rebinding</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-75583</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ridafkih keeper.sh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;keeper.sh&amp;#39;s calendar module version prior to 2.18.14 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) guard bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to reach private network addresses by exploiting a DNS rebinding attack against the two-phase URL validation and connection flow. The SSRF guard validates a hostname&amp;#39;s resolved IP addresses but discards them before the actual HTTP connection is opened, allowing an attacker who controls authoritative DNS to return a public address during validation and a private address during the subsequent independent socket-level DNS resolution, causing the guard to pass while the outbound connection reaches internal infrastructure such as cloud instance metadata endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ridafkih keeper.sh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;keeper.sh&amp;#39;s calendar module version prior to 2.18.14 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) guard bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to reach private network addresses by exploiting a DNS rebinding attack against the two-phase URL validation and connection flow. The SSRF guard validates a hostname&amp;#39;s resolved IP addresses but discards them before the actual HTTP connection is opened, allowing an attacker who controls authoritative DNS to return a public address during validation and a private address during the subsequent independent socket-level DNS resolution, causing the guard to pass while the outbound connection reaches internal infrastructure such as cloud instance metadata endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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