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      <title>CVE-2026-101028 — Ash.count, Ash.exists and Ash.aggregate skip related resources' read policies in filters and sorts</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-101028</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an actor to infer data in related records they cannot read via Ash.count/2, Ash.exists/2 and Ash.aggregate/3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ash.Actions.Aggregate.run/4 (lib/ash/actions/aggregate.ex) applied only the root resource&amp;#39;s read policy before running the aggregate query. The read path also applies each related resource&amp;#39;s read policy to filter and sort references that cross a relationship, directly (for example comments.body) or through an aggregate over one, but the aggregate path skipped that step. A caller whose filter or sort reaches these functions, for example through Ash.Query.filter_input/2, an ash_lua script, or an AshAi tool offering count or exists results, can test conditions against related rows hidden from them and recover their existence and attribute values one query at a time. Ash.read/2 and its page counts are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash: from 2.6.0 before 3.34.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an actor to infer data in related records they cannot read via Ash.count/2, Ash.exists/2 and Ash.aggregate/3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ash.Actions.Aggregate.run/4 (lib/ash/actions/aggregate.ex) applied only the root resource&amp;#39;s read policy before running the aggregate query. The read path also applies each related resource&amp;#39;s read policy to filter and sort references that cross a relationship, directly (for example comments.body) or through an aggregate over one, but the aggregate path skipped that step. A caller whose filter or sort reaches these functions, for example through Ash.Query.filter_input/2, an ash_lua script, or an AshAi tool offering count or exists results, can test conditions against related rows hidden from them and recover their existence and attribute values one query at a time. Ash.read/2 and its page counts are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash: from 2.6.0 before 3.34.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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