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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 20:51:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-97612</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97612</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated
on !skb-&amp;gt;inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it
outlives the encapsulation it describes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose
inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a
label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives
key-&amp;gt;eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push
again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb-&amp;gt;network_header = skb-&amp;gt;inner_network_header;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_network_offset(skb) &amp;gt; MAX_L2_LEN)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);
	memcpy(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;l2_data, skb-&amp;gt;data, hlen);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20
  RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000
   prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0
   ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0
   do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0
   do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30
   ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same root-cause shape as com…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated
on !skb-&amp;gt;inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it
outlives the encapsulation it describes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose
inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a
label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives
key-&amp;gt;eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push
again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb-&amp;gt;network_header = skb-&amp;gt;inner_network_header;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_network_offset(skb) &amp;gt; MAX_L2_LEN)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);
	memcpy(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;l2_data, skb-&amp;gt;data, hlen);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20
  RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000
   prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0
   ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0
   do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0
   do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30
   ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same root-cause shape as com…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97612</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gqv9-8gxf-xx6g</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gqv9-8gxf-xx6g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated
on !skb-&amp;gt;inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it
outlives the encapsulation it describes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose
inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a
label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives
key-&amp;gt;eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push
again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb-&amp;gt;network_header = skb-&amp;gt;inner_network_header;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_network_offset(skb) &amp;gt; MAX_L2_LEN)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);
	memcpy(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;l2_data, skb-&amp;gt;data, hlen);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20
  RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000
   prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0
   ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0
   do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0
   do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30
   ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same root-cause shape as com…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated
on !skb-&amp;gt;inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it
outlives the encapsulation it describes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose
inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a
label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives
key-&amp;gt;eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push
again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb-&amp;gt;network_header = skb-&amp;gt;inner_network_header;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_network_offset(skb) &amp;gt; MAX_L2_LEN)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);
	memcpy(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;l2_data, skb-&amp;gt;data, hlen);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20
  RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000
   prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0
   ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0
   do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0
   do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30
   ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same root-cause shape as com…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gqv9-8gxf-xx6g</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-97612</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97612</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated on !skb-&amp;gt;inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it outlives the encapsulation it describes. Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives key-&amp;gt;eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record: 	skb-&amp;gt;network_header = skb-&amp;gt;inner_network_header; so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed: 	if (skb_network_offset(skb) &amp;gt; MAX_L2_LEN) a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value: 	unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb); 	memcpy(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;l2_data, skb-&amp;gt;data, hlen); which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer. Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):   BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000   #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode   Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI   RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20   RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000    prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0    ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0    do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0    do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30    ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450 Same root-cause shape as commit 975b5b06…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated on !skb-&amp;gt;inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it outlives the encapsulation it describes. Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives key-&amp;gt;eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record: 	skb-&amp;gt;network_header = skb-&amp;gt;inner_network_header; so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed: 	if (skb_network_offset(skb) &amp;gt; MAX_L2_LEN) a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value: 	unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb); 	memcpy(&amp;amp;data-&amp;gt;l2_data, skb-&amp;gt;data, hlen); which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer. Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):   BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000   #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode   Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI   RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20   RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000    prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0    ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0    do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0    do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30    ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450 Same root-cause shape as commit 975b5b06…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97612</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
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