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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 19:47:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-97437</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-97437</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-97437</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-97437</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97437</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname-&amp;gt;name_len (a
character count) against e-&amp;gt;size (a byte count) without accounting
for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME
header size:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (fname-&amp;gt;name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) &amp;gt; le16_to_cpu(e-&amp;gt;size))&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This computes: name_len + 16 &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes
before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +
  name_len * sizeof(short) &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h
and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used
in the readdir path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e-&amp;gt;size
but large fname-&amp;gt;name_len bypasses the current check, causing
ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the
declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing
comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup
path.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname-&amp;gt;name_len (a
character count) against e-&amp;gt;size (a byte count) without accounting
for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME
header size:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (fname-&amp;gt;name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) &amp;gt; le16_to_cpu(e-&amp;gt;size))&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This computes: name_len + 16 &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes
before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +
  name_len * sizeof(short) &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h
and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used
in the readdir path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e-&amp;gt;size
but large fname-&amp;gt;name_len bypasses the current check, causing
ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the
declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing
comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup
path.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97437</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fpf4-vw37-hxfh</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fpf4-vw37-hxfh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname-&amp;gt;name_len (a
character count) against e-&amp;gt;size (a byte count) without accounting
for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME
header size:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (fname-&amp;gt;name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) &amp;gt; le16_to_cpu(e-&amp;gt;size))&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This computes: name_len + 16 &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes
before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +
  name_len * sizeof(short) &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h
and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used
in the readdir path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e-&amp;gt;size
but large fname-&amp;gt;name_len bypasses the current check, causing
ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the
declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing
comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup
path.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname-&amp;gt;name_len (a
character count) against e-&amp;gt;size (a byte count) without accounting
for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME
header size:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (fname-&amp;gt;name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) &amp;gt; le16_to_cpu(e-&amp;gt;size))&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This computes: name_len + 16 &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes
before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +
  name_len * sizeof(short) &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 &amp;gt; e_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h
and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used
in the readdir path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e-&amp;gt;size
but large fname-&amp;gt;name_len bypasses the current check, causing
ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the
declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing
comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup
path.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fpf4-vw37-hxfh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-97437</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97437</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e() The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname-&amp;gt;name_len (a character count) against e-&amp;gt;size (a byte count) without accounting for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME header size:   if (fname-&amp;gt;name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) &amp;gt; le16_to_cpu(e-&amp;gt;size)) This computes: name_len + 16 &amp;gt; e_size The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):   sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +   name_len * sizeof(short) &amp;gt; e_size Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 &amp;gt; e_size The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used in the readdir path. A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e-&amp;gt;size but large fname-&amp;gt;name_len bypasses the current check, causing ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary. Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup path.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e() The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname-&amp;gt;name_len (a character count) against e-&amp;gt;size (a byte count) without accounting for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME header size:   if (fname-&amp;gt;name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) &amp;gt; le16_to_cpu(e-&amp;gt;size)) This computes: name_len + 16 &amp;gt; e_size The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):   sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +   name_len * sizeof(short) &amp;gt; e_size Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 &amp;gt; e_size The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used in the readdir path. A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e-&amp;gt;size but large fname-&amp;gt;name_len bypasses the current check, causing ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary. Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup path.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97437</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
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