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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:33:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90414</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90414</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90414</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1253 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1253</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90414</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90414</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without
ever looking at wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed
in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the
data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS
(ntoh24(hdr-&amp;gt;dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -
out of the fixed-size descriptor:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():
        sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),
                            unsol_data_len);
  isert_handle_scsi_cmd():
        sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd-&amp;gt;se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,
                            isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the declared length is never checked against wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, an
initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually
sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of
the receive buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against
    conn_ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,
    used here for the inbound check.
  - iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets
    ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops-&amp;gt;TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;
    and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in
    iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without
ever looking at wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed
in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the
data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS
(ntoh24(hdr-&amp;gt;dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -
out of the fixed-size descriptor:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():
        sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),
                            unsol_data_len);
  isert_handle_scsi_cmd():
        sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd-&amp;gt;se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,
                            isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the declared length is never checked against wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, an
initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually
sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of
the receive buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against
    conn_ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,
    used here for the inbound check.
  - iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets
    ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops-&amp;gt;TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;
    and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in
    iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90414</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-78ww-6hfv-8292</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-78ww-6hfv-8292</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without
ever looking at wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed
in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the
data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS
(ntoh24(hdr-&amp;gt;dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -
out of the fixed-size descriptor:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():
        sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),
                            unsol_data_len);
  isert_handle_scsi_cmd():
        sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd-&amp;gt;se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,
                            isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the declared length is never checked against wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, an
initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually
sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of
the receive buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against
    conn_ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,
    used here for the inbound check.
  - iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets
    ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops-&amp;gt;TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;
    and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in
    iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without
ever looking at wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed
in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the
data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS
(ntoh24(hdr-&amp;gt;dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -
out of the fixed-size descriptor:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():
        sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),
                            unsol_data_len);
  isert_handle_scsi_cmd():
        sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd-&amp;gt;se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,
                            isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the declared length is never checked against wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, an
initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually
sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of
the receive buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against
    conn_ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,
    used here for the inbound check.
  - iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets
    ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops-&amp;gt;TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;
    and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in
    iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-78ww-6hfv-8292</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4185 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-4185</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read
inst-&amp;amp;gt;ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw()
of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl
mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new
array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the
dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does
not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index
into it, causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dumped set itself stays pinned via set-&amp;amp;gt;ref_netlink, so only the
array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching
ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150
  Call Trace:
   ...
   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
   ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
   netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
   netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976)
   sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159)
   __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315)
   ...
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-can…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read
inst-&amp;amp;gt;ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw()
of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl
mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new
array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the
dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does
not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index
into it, causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dumped set itself stays pinned via set-&amp;amp;gt;ref_netlink, so only the
array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching
ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150
  Call Trace:
   ...
   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
   ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
   netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
   netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976)
   sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159)
   __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315)
   ...
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-can…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-4185</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11893-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90414</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90414</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without ever looking at wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS (ntoh24(hdr-&amp;gt;dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) - out of the fixed-size descriptor:   isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():         sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),                             unsol_data_len);   isert_handle_scsi_cmd():         sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd-&amp;gt;se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,                             isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len); Because the declared length is never checked against wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, an initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of the receive buffer. Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:   - __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against     conn_ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,     used here for the inbound check.   - iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets     ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops-&amp;gt;TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;     and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in     iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the val…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without ever looking at wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS (ntoh24(hdr-&amp;gt;dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) - out of the fixed-size descriptor:   isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():         sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),                             unsol_data_len);   isert_handle_scsi_cmd():         sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd-&amp;gt;se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,                             isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len); Because the declared length is never checked against wc-&amp;gt;byte_len, an initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of the receive buffer. Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:   - __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against     conn_ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,     used here for the inbound check.   - iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets     ops-&amp;gt;MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops-&amp;gt;TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;     and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in     iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the val…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90414</guid>
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