<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 07:50:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90312</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90312</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90312</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90312</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90312</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Check load-acquire src ptr type before the load&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;check_atomic_load() calls check_load_mem() before atomic_ptr_type_ok().
For a load-acquire that fetches into its own source register (dst_reg ==
src_reg), check_load_mem() overwrites src_reg&amp;#39;s type with the type of the
loaded value, so the subsequent atomic_ptr_type_ok() no longer sees the
source pointer and fails to reject the disallowed types (ctx, pkt,
flow_keys, sock).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() does not rewrite atomic loads, the raw
access to the underlying kernel object is left in place. The destination
type is taken from the ctx access itself, so a load-acquire of the sk
field of struct __sk_buff for example leaves the register typed as
PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL, which type_is_sk_pointer() does not match
either, while it actually holds unconverted struct sk_buff bytes. Once
the NULL check has passed this is a type confusion, not just a leak of
kernel data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate src_reg with check_reg_arg() and check the source pointer type
with atomic_ptr_type_ok() before the load again, mirroring
check_atomic_rmw(). Out-of-range register numbers are already rejected
earlier by check_and_resolve_insns() (commit 503d21ef8eac (&amp;#34;bpf: Do
register range validation early&amp;#34;)), and the only exemption there,
is_stack_arg_ldx(), requires BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW and thus never
matches a BPF_ATOMIC insn. atomic_ptr_type_ok() can therefore not
dereference regist…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Check load-acquire src ptr type before the load&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;check_atomic_load() calls check_load_mem() before atomic_ptr_type_ok().
For a load-acquire that fetches into its own source register (dst_reg ==
src_reg), check_load_mem() overwrites src_reg&amp;#39;s type with the type of the
loaded value, so the subsequent atomic_ptr_type_ok() no longer sees the
source pointer and fails to reject the disallowed types (ctx, pkt,
flow_keys, sock).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() does not rewrite atomic loads, the raw
access to the underlying kernel object is left in place. The destination
type is taken from the ctx access itself, so a load-acquire of the sk
field of struct __sk_buff for example leaves the register typed as
PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL, which type_is_sk_pointer() does not match
either, while it actually holds unconverted struct sk_buff bytes. Once
the NULL check has passed this is a type confusion, not just a leak of
kernel data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate src_reg with check_reg_arg() and check the source pointer type
with atomic_ptr_type_ok() before the load again, mirroring
check_atomic_rmw(). Out-of-range register numbers are already rejected
earlier by check_and_resolve_insns() (commit 503d21ef8eac (&amp;#34;bpf: Do
register range validation early&amp;#34;)), and the only exemption there,
is_stack_arg_ldx(), requires BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW and thus never
matches a BPF_ATOMIC insn. atomic_ptr_type_ok() can therefore not
dereference regist…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90312</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4gcp-c78x-x35m</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4gcp-c78x-x35m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Check load-acquire src ptr type before the load&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;check_atomic_load() calls check_load_mem() before atomic_ptr_type_ok().
For a load-acquire that fetches into its own source register (dst_reg ==
src_reg), check_load_mem() overwrites src_reg&amp;#39;s type with the type of the
loaded value, so the subsequent atomic_ptr_type_ok() no longer sees the
source pointer and fails to reject the disallowed types (ctx, pkt,
flow_keys, sock).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() does not rewrite atomic loads, the raw
access to the underlying kernel object is left in place. The destination
type is taken from the ctx access itself, so a load-acquire of the sk
field of struct __sk_buff for example leaves the register typed as
PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL, which type_is_sk_pointer() does not match
either, while it actually holds unconverted struct sk_buff bytes. Once
the NULL check has passed this is a type confusion, not just a leak of
kernel data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate src_reg with check_reg_arg() and check the source pointer type
with atomic_ptr_type_ok() before the load again, mirroring
check_atomic_rmw(). Out-of-range register numbers are already rejected
earlier by check_and_resolve_insns() (commit 503d21ef8eac (&amp;#34;bpf: Do
register range validation early&amp;#34;)), and the only exemption there,
is_stack_arg_ldx(), requires BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW and thus never
matches a BPF_ATOMIC insn. atomic_ptr_type_ok() can therefore not
dereference regist…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Check load-acquire src ptr type before the load&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;check_atomic_load() calls check_load_mem() before atomic_ptr_type_ok().
For a load-acquire that fetches into its own source register (dst_reg ==
src_reg), check_load_mem() overwrites src_reg&amp;#39;s type with the type of the
loaded value, so the subsequent atomic_ptr_type_ok() no longer sees the
source pointer and fails to reject the disallowed types (ctx, pkt,
flow_keys, sock).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() does not rewrite atomic loads, the raw
access to the underlying kernel object is left in place. The destination
type is taken from the ctx access itself, so a load-acquire of the sk
field of struct __sk_buff for example leaves the register typed as
PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL, which type_is_sk_pointer() does not match
either, while it actually holds unconverted struct sk_buff bytes. Once
the NULL check has passed this is a type confusion, not just a leak of
kernel data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate src_reg with check_reg_arg() and check the source pointer type
with atomic_ptr_type_ok() before the load again, mirroring
check_atomic_rmw(). Out-of-range register numbers are already rejected
earlier by check_and_resolve_insns() (commit 503d21ef8eac (&amp;#34;bpf: Do
register range validation early&amp;#34;)), and the only exemption there,
is_stack_arg_ldx(), requires BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW and thus never
matches a BPF_ATOMIC insn. atomic_ptr_type_ok() can therefore not
dereference regist…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4gcp-c78x-x35m</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90312</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90312</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Check load-acquire src ptr type before the load check_atomic_load() calls check_load_mem() before atomic_ptr_type_ok(). For a load-acquire that fetches into its own source register (dst_reg == src_reg), check_load_mem() overwrites src_reg&amp;#39;s type with the type of the loaded value, so the subsequent atomic_ptr_type_ok() no longer sees the source pointer and fails to reject the disallowed types (ctx, pkt, flow_keys, sock). Since bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() does not rewrite atomic loads, the raw access to the underlying kernel object is left in place. The destination type is taken from the ctx access itself, so a load-acquire of the sk field of struct __sk_buff for example leaves the register typed as PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL, which type_is_sk_pointer() does not match either, while it actually holds unconverted struct sk_buff bytes. Once the NULL check has passed this is a type confusion, not just a leak of kernel data. Validate src_reg with check_reg_arg() and check the source pointer type with atomic_ptr_type_ok() before the load again, mirroring check_atomic_rmw(). Out-of-range register numbers are already rejected earlier by check_and_resolve_insns() (commit 503d21ef8eac (&amp;#34;bpf: Do register range validation early&amp;#34;)), and the only exemption there, is_stack_arg_ldx(), requires BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW and thus never matches a BPF_ATOMIC insn. atomic_ptr_type_ok() can therefore not dereference register s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Check load-acquire src ptr type before the load check_atomic_load() calls check_load_mem() before atomic_ptr_type_ok(). For a load-acquire that fetches into its own source register (dst_reg == src_reg), check_load_mem() overwrites src_reg&amp;#39;s type with the type of the loaded value, so the subsequent atomic_ptr_type_ok() no longer sees the source pointer and fails to reject the disallowed types (ctx, pkt, flow_keys, sock). Since bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() does not rewrite atomic loads, the raw access to the underlying kernel object is left in place. The destination type is taken from the ctx access itself, so a load-acquire of the sk field of struct __sk_buff for example leaves the register typed as PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL, which type_is_sk_pointer() does not match either, while it actually holds unconverted struct sk_buff bytes. Once the NULL check has passed this is a type confusion, not just a leak of kernel data. Validate src_reg with check_reg_arg() and check the source pointer type with atomic_ptr_type_ok() before the load again, mirroring check_atomic_rmw(). Out-of-range register numbers are already rejected earlier by check_and_resolve_insns() (commit 503d21ef8eac (&amp;#34;bpf: Do register range validation early&amp;#34;)), and the only exemption there, is_stack_arg_ldx(), requires BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW and thus never matches a BPF_ATOMIC insn. atomic_ptr_type_ok() can therefore not dereference register s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90312</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
