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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 07:50:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90244</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90244</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90244</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90244</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90244</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike a group&amp;#39;s default domain, which is always freshly allocated
and privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1&amp;#39;s
legacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing
domain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller&amp;#39;s own group mutex is
held (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes
IOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned
through the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and
allocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands
on a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices&amp;#39; domains
are the same merged domain, so both can enter
iommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;commit 288683c92b1a (&amp;#34;iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a
generic operation&amp;#34;) dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the
reasoning that &amp;#34;each iommu_domain is unique to a group,&amp;#34; which holds
for default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static
lock, since it&amp;#39;s only guarding a corner case and will likely never
be contended.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers
(iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever
reaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can&amp;#39;t mirror that since it
dispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outsid…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike a group&amp;#39;s default domain, which is always freshly allocated
and privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1&amp;#39;s
legacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing
domain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller&amp;#39;s own group mutex is
held (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes
IOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned
through the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and
allocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands
on a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices&amp;#39; domains
are the same merged domain, so both can enter
iommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;commit 288683c92b1a (&amp;#34;iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a
generic operation&amp;#34;) dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the
reasoning that &amp;#34;each iommu_domain is unique to a group,&amp;#34; which holds
for default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static
lock, since it&amp;#39;s only guarding a corner case and will likely never
be contended.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers
(iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever
reaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can&amp;#39;t mirror that since it
dispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outsid…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90244</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rjf9-x7mr-46ph</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rjf9-x7mr-46ph</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike a group&amp;#39;s default domain, which is always freshly allocated
and privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1&amp;#39;s
legacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing
domain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller&amp;#39;s own group mutex is
held (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes
IOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned
through the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and
allocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands
on a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices&amp;#39; domains
are the same merged domain, so both can enter
iommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;commit 288683c92b1a (&amp;#34;iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a
generic operation&amp;#34;) dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the
reasoning that &amp;#34;each iommu_domain is unique to a group,&amp;#34; which holds
for default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static
lock, since it&amp;#39;s only guarding a corner case and will likely never
be contended.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers
(iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever
reaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can&amp;#39;t mirror that since it
dispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outsid…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike a group&amp;#39;s default domain, which is always freshly allocated
and privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1&amp;#39;s
legacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing
domain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller&amp;#39;s own group mutex is
held (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes
IOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned
through the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and
allocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands
on a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices&amp;#39; domains
are the same merged domain, so both can enter
iommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;commit 288683c92b1a (&amp;#34;iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a
generic operation&amp;#34;) dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the
reasoning that &amp;#34;each iommu_domain is unique to a group,&amp;#34; which holds
for default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static
lock, since it&amp;#39;s only guarding a corner case and will likely never
be contended.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers
(iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever
reaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can&amp;#39;t mirror that since it
dispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outsid…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rjf9-x7mr-46ph</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90244</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90244</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list Unlike a group&amp;#39;s default domain, which is always freshly allocated and privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1&amp;#39;s legacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing domain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match. iommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller&amp;#39;s own group mutex is held (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes IOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned through the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and allocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands on a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices&amp;#39; domains are the same merged domain, so both can enter iommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list. commit 288683c92b1a (&amp;#34;iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a generic operation&amp;#34;) dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the reasoning that &amp;#34;each iommu_domain is unique to a group,&amp;#34; which holds for default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static lock, since it&amp;#39;s only guarding a corner case and will likely never be contended. iommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers (iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever reaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can&amp;#39;t mirror that since it dispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outside VFI…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list Unlike a group&amp;#39;s default domain, which is always freshly allocated and privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1&amp;#39;s legacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing domain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match. iommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller&amp;#39;s own group mutex is held (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes IOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned through the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and allocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands on a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices&amp;#39; domains are the same merged domain, so both can enter iommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list. commit 288683c92b1a (&amp;#34;iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a generic operation&amp;#34;) dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the reasoning that &amp;#34;each iommu_domain is unique to a group,&amp;#34; which holds for default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static lock, since it&amp;#39;s only guarding a corner case and will likely never be contended. iommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers (iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever reaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can&amp;#39;t mirror that since it dispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outside VFI…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90244</guid>
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