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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 08:56:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90011</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90011</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90011</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90011</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90011</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose
DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; and
login-&amp;gt;req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding
bytes, where&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;padding = ((-payload_length) &amp;amp; 3);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte
buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL
terminator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path
chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls
strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a
length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL
to &amp;#39;;&amp;#39;, so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value
records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the
object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated
initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is
not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and
the CHAP path is never entered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to
it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes, so the buffer is always terminated.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose
DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; and
login-&amp;gt;req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding
bytes, where&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;padding = ((-payload_length) &amp;amp; 3);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte
buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL
terminator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path
chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls
strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a
length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL
to &amp;#39;;&amp;#39;, so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value
records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the
object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated
initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is
not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and
the CHAP path is never entered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to
it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes, so the buffer is always terminated.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90011</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m4f8-5753-34xg</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-m4f8-5753-34xg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose
DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; and
login-&amp;gt;req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding
bytes, where&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;padding = ((-payload_length) &amp;amp; 3);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte
buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL
terminator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path
chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls
strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a
length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL
to &amp;#39;;&amp;#39;, so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value
records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the
object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated
initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is
not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and
the CHAP path is never entered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to
it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes, so the buffer is always terminated.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose
DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; and
login-&amp;gt;req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding
bytes, where&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;padding = ((-payload_length) &amp;amp; 3);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte
buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL
terminator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path
chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls
strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a
length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL
to &amp;#39;;&amp;#39;, so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value
records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the
object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated
initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is
not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and
the CHAP path is never entered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to
it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes, so the buffer is always terminated.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-m4f8-5753-34xg</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-90011 — scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90011</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-90011</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90011</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90011</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90011</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; and login-&amp;gt;req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding bytes, where 	padding = ((-payload_length) &amp;amp; 3); any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL terminator. The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL to &amp;#39;;&amp;#39;, so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and the CHAP path is never entered. Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS bytes, so the buffer is always terminated.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is &amp;#39;&amp;gt;&amp;#39; and login-&amp;gt;req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding bytes, where 	padding = ((-payload_length) &amp;amp; 3); any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL terminator. The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL to &amp;#39;;&amp;#39;, so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and the CHAP path is never entered. Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS bytes, so the buffer is always terminated.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90011</guid>
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