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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:55:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-65831</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-65831</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.7.1, a reader-role user can submit POST /api/v1/command/{database} with language: js because PolyglotQueryEngine.command, PolyglotQueryEngine.analyze, and PolyglotQueryEngine.registerFunctions do not enforce database-administrator authorization. GraalPolyglotEngine also permits scripts to bypass the allowedPackages whitelist by reflecting from the bound database object through database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass to arbitrary host classes. These cooperating defects allow a read-only database user to read arbitrary host files outside the database scope. Process creation is already blocked, so OS command execution is not confirmed. The issue is distinct from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076, and CVE-2026-54077. This issue is fixed in version 26.7.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.7.1, a reader-role user can submit POST /api/v1/command/{database} with language: js because PolyglotQueryEngine.command, PolyglotQueryEngine.analyze, and PolyglotQueryEngine.registerFunctions do not enforce database-administrator authorization. GraalPolyglotEngine also permits scripts to bypass the allowedPackages whitelist by reflecting from the bound database object through database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass to arbitrary host classes. These cooperating defects allow a read-only database user to read arbitrary host files outside the database scope. Process creation is already blocked, so OS command execution is not confirmed. The issue is distinct from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076, and CVE-2026-54077. This issue is fixed in version 26.7.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-65831</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr — ArcadeDB: Privilege escalation via reader role in /api/v1/command JS scripting language — arbitrary host file read</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-48qw-824m-86pr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user holding only `reader` (read-only) privileges on a single database could execute arbitrary JVM code by sending a `&amp;#34;language&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;js&amp;#34;` command to the `POST /api/v1/command/{database}` HTTP endpoint, and use it to read arbitrary files on the host filesystem (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, configuration files), outside the scope of the database itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two cooperating defects made this possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Missing authorization on the scripting path (CWE-863 / CWE-269).** Polyglot script execution (`js` and other GraalVM languages) never went through the database authorization checks applied to SQL/Cypher, so any authenticated principal - regardless of database role - could run scripts.
2. **Sandbox whitelist bypass.** The GraalVM sandbox restricts direct class lookups to a configured `allowedPackages` list, but a script could reach arbitrary classes by reflecting off the bound `database` object: `database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass(&amp;#34;java.io.File&amp;#34;)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Process creation was already blocked (`allowCreateProcess(false)`), so the confirmed impact is host **file read**, not OS command execution. Confidentiality: High. Integrity/Availability: None.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a distinct entry point and root cause from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076 and CVE-2026-54077, and is reproducible on builds that already contain those fixes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix is applied in the engine so it covers every entry point (HTTP command, HA-forwarded commands, MCP `analyze`), not only the HTTP handler:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- P…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user holding only `reader` (read-only) privileges on a single database could execute arbitrary JVM code by sending a `&amp;#34;language&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;js&amp;#34;` command to the `POST /api/v1/command/{database}` HTTP endpoint, and use it to read arbitrary files on the host filesystem (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, configuration files), outside the scope of the database itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two cooperating defects made this possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Missing authorization on the scripting path (CWE-863 / CWE-269).** Polyglot script execution (`js` and other GraalVM languages) never went through the database authorization checks applied to SQL/Cypher, so any authenticated principal - regardless of database role - could run scripts.
2. **Sandbox whitelist bypass.** The GraalVM sandbox restricts direct class lookups to a configured `allowedPackages` list, but a script could reach arbitrary classes by reflecting off the bound `database` object: `database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass(&amp;#34;java.io.File&amp;#34;)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Process creation was already blocked (`allowCreateProcess(false)`), so the confirmed impact is host **file read**, not OS command execution. Confidentiality: High. Integrity/Availability: None.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a distinct entry point and root cause from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076 and CVE-2026-54077, and is reproducible on builds that already contain those fixes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix is applied in the engine so it covers every entry point (HTTP command, HA-forwarded commands, MCP `analyze`), not only the HTTP handler:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- P…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-48qw-824m-86pr</guid>
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