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fkie_cve-2026-59168

Dasel is a command-line tool and library for querying, modifying, and transforming data structures. From 3.0.0 until 3.11.1, parsing/json/json_reader.go decodeValue, decodeObject, and decodeArray, and parsing/xml/reader.go parseElement, recurse once per input nesting level without a depth guard. Deeply nested attacker-controlled JSON or XML supplied through parsing.Format(...).NewReader(...).Read(data), the command-line interface, or the parse selector function can exhaust the Go goroutine stack and raise an unrecoverable fatal error that terminates the entire process. The XML input-size limit does not prevent depth exhaustion, and defer or recover cannot intercept the failure. This issue is fixed in version 3.11.1.

GHSA-cqxr-jxr2-85pq — Dasel: Unbounded recursion in JSON and XML readers causes unrecoverable stack-overflow DoS

Affected: Go: github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3

## Summary

`dasel`'s JSON and XML readers parse nested structures with unbounded recursion, one native stack frame per nesting level, with no depth guard. A small (sub-10 MB), deeply nested document drives the Go runtime past its goroutine stack limit and triggers a `fatal error: stack overflow`. This is **unrecoverable**: it is a runtime fatal error, not a `panic`, so a consumer's `defer`/`recover` cannot intercept it, the entire process dies.

Both readers are affected; neither has a depth limit, and the JSON reader additionally has no input-size cap (the XML reader caps size at 10 MB but not depth).

## Affected Versions

`github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3` and all v3.x releases through **v3.11.0** (current `main`, commit `abc1e1d`). This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.1. Pre-v3 is out of scope.

## Description

### JSON reader @ `parsing/json/json_reader.go`

`decodeValue` (line 54) dispatches to the mutually-recursive `decodeObject` (line 78) and `decodeArray` (line 140). Each calls back into both for nested values (`decodeArray`→`decodeArray` at line 151, `decodeObject` at 163; `decodeObject`→`decodeArray` at 95, `decodeObject` at 111). Every `[` or `{` in the input adds one stack frame. There is **no depth counter and no `len(data)` cap** anywhere in the reader.

### XML reader @`parsing/xml/reader.go`

`parseElement` (line 172) recurses at line 211 for every `xml.StartElement`. The file declares explicit DoS guards — `maxXMLSize = 10_000_000`, comment count/length — but…

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-59168

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: dasel, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: dasel