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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 20:19:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-14524</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-14524</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-14524</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-14524</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49837</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49837</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;GoBGP is an open source Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) implementation in the Go Programming Language. Versions prior to 4.6.0 contain a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`. A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant case is the 4-octet AS capability, where a capability with `CapLen == 0` may cause the parser to read bytes from the following capability as the 4-octet AS value. This parsed value may later affect peer AS validation during BGP session establishment. Version 4.6.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;GoBGP is an open source Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) implementation in the Go Programming Language. Versions prior to 4.6.0 contain a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`. A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant case is the 4-octet AS capability, where a capability with `CapLen == 0` may cause the parser to read bytes from the following capability as the 4-octet AS value. This parsed value may later affect peer AS validation during BGP session establishment. Version 4.6.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49837</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gjrg-jjr3-56cm — GoBGP: BGP OPEN capability parser may read capability values outside declared CapLen boundaries</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gjrg-jjr3-56cm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/osrg/gobgp/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
    GoBGP contains a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`.
    A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant case is the 4-octet AS capability, where a capability with `CapLen == 0` may cause the parser to read bytes from the following capability as the 4-octet AS value. This parsed value may later affect peer AS validation during BGP session establishment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The issue is in the BGP OPEN capability parser under:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go`
- `pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go`
- 
The BGP OPEN optional parameter capability format includes a capability code, a capability length field, and a capability value. Each concrete capability decoder should only parse bytes inside the declared capability value boundary.
In affected versions, the generic capability parser records the declared `CapLen`, but several concrete capability decoders continue parsing from the full remaining capability buffer after advancing past the two-byte capability header. Conceptually, the vulnerable pattern is:
```go
data = data[2:]
// decoder reads from data without first limiting it to CapLen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The following parser-level proof of concept demonstrates the issue without requiring a full BGP session or a running `…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/osrg/gobgp/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
    GoBGP contains a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`.
    A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant case is the 4-octet AS capability, where a capability with `CapLen == 0` may cause the parser to read bytes from the following capability as the 4-octet AS value. This parsed value may later affect peer AS validation during BGP session establishment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The issue is in the BGP OPEN capability parser under:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go`
- `pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go`
- 
The BGP OPEN optional parameter capability format includes a capability code, a capability length field, and a capability value. Each concrete capability decoder should only parse bytes inside the declared capability value boundary.
In affected versions, the generic capability parser records the declared `CapLen`, but several concrete capability decoders continue parsing from the full remaining capability buffer after advancing past the two-byte capability header. Conceptually, the vulnerable pattern is:
```go
data = data[2:]
// decoder reads from data without first limiting it to CapLen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The following parser-level proof of concept demonstrates the issue without requiring a full BGP session or a running `…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gjrg-jjr3-56cm</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-49837</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-49837</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:25.10: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: gobgp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GoBGP is an open source Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) implementation in the Go Programming Language. Versions prior to 4.6.0 contain a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`. A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant case is the 4-octet AS capability, where a capability with `CapLen == 0` may cause the parser to read bytes from the following capability as the 4-octet AS value. This parsed value may later affect peer AS validation during BGP session establishment. Version 4.6.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:25.10: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: gobgp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GoBGP is an open source Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) implementation in the Go Programming Language. Versions prior to 4.6.0 contain a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`. A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant case is the 4-octet AS capability, where a capability with `CapLen == 0` may cause the parser to read bytes from the following capability as the 4-octet AS value. This parsed value may later affect peer AS validation during BGP session establishment. Version 4.6.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-49837</guid>
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