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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-107361</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107361</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Arkime live capture service (arkime-live) in Malcolm runs with network_mode: host, exposing port 8005 on all network interfaces (viewHost=0.0.0.0). Arkime trusts the X-Forwarded-User header from any IP address (userAuthIps=::,0.0.0.0/0) and auto-creates users with full access. The passwordSecret is hardcoded to the public value &amp;#34;Malcolm&amp;#34;. A network-adjacent attacker bypasses nginx entirely by connecting directly to port 8005 with a forged identity header.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Arkime live capture service (arkime-live) in Malcolm runs with network_mode: host, exposing port 8005 on all network interfaces (viewHost=0.0.0.0). Arkime trusts the X-Forwarded-User header from any IP address (userAuthIps=::,0.0.0.0/0) and auto-creates users with full access. The passwordSecret is hardcoded to the public value &amp;#34;Malcolm&amp;#34;. A network-adjacent attacker bypasses nginx entirely by connecting directly to port 8005 with a forged identity header.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107361</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-9jvx-84p5-48xr</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9jvx-84p5-48xr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Arkime live capture service (arkime-live) in Malcolm runs with network_mode: host, exposing port 8005 on all network interfaces (viewHost=0.0.0.0). Arkime trusts the X-Forwarded-User header from any IP address (userAuthIps=::,0.0.0.0/0) and auto-creates users with full access. The passwordSecret is hardcoded to the public value &amp;#34;Malcolm&amp;#34;. A network-adjacent attacker bypasses nginx entirely by connecting directly to port 8005 with a forged identity header.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Arkime live capture service (arkime-live) in Malcolm runs with network_mode: host, exposing port 8005 on all network interfaces (viewHost=0.0.0.0). Arkime trusts the X-Forwarded-User header from any IP address (userAuthIps=::,0.0.0.0/0) and auto-creates users with full access. The passwordSecret is hardcoded to the public value &amp;#34;Malcolm&amp;#34;. A network-adjacent attacker bypasses nginx entirely by connecting directly to port 8005 with a forged identity header.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9jvx-84p5-48xr</guid>
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      <title>ICSA-26-280-01 — CISA Malcolm</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/icsa-26-280-01</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s front nginx reverse proxy defines a &amp;#34;Dashboards → Arkime shortcut&amp;#34; location using a case-insensitive regex matcher but a case-sensitive rewrite. A request whose path segment is not exact-lowercase (for example /IDDASH2ARK/...) enters the location (the matcher fires) but evades the rewrite (no redirect is issued), so nginx falls through to the location&amp;#39;s proxy_pass to the Arkime backend. That location is the one proxied location in the shipped config that does not include the per-location authentication file, so the request reaches Arkime unauthenticated. The same location also forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header un-overwritten, and Arkime is configured to trust X-Forwarded-User as the authenticated username — so an unauthenticated network caller can reach the Arkime backend while supplying a forged, auto-provisioned identity. Malcolm&amp;#39;s nginx based reverse proxy contains a URL path normalization inconsistency between its Lua based role-based access control (RBAC) authorization layer and nginx&amp;#39;s own request routing logic. An authenticated user can craft a specially formatted request path to bypass role-based restrictions and reach administrative or role gated endpoints they should not have access to. This affects all restricted paths protected by the RBAC authorization layer, including file upload, PHP server, htadmin, and authentication management interfaces. Malcolm file-upload component ships the upstream FilePond PHP server (pqina/filepond-server-p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s front nginx reverse proxy defines a &amp;#34;Dashboards → Arkime shortcut&amp;#34; location using a case-insensitive regex matcher but a case-sensitive rewrite. A request whose path segment is not exact-lowercase (for example /IDDASH2ARK/...) enters the location (the matcher fires) but evades the rewrite (no redirect is issued), so nginx falls through to the location&amp;#39;s proxy_pass to the Arkime backend. That location is the one proxied location in the shipped config that does not include the per-location authentication file, so the request reaches Arkime unauthenticated. The same location also forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header un-overwritten, and Arkime is configured to trust X-Forwarded-User as the authenticated username — so an unauthenticated network caller can reach the Arkime backend while supplying a forged, auto-provisioned identity. Malcolm&amp;#39;s nginx based reverse proxy contains a URL path normalization inconsistency between its Lua based role-based access control (RBAC) authorization layer and nginx&amp;#39;s own request routing logic. An authenticated user can craft a specially formatted request path to bypass role-based restrictions and reach administrative or role gated endpoints they should not have access to. This affects all restricted paths protected by the RBAC authorization layer, including file upload, PHP server, htadmin, and authentication management interfaces. Malcolm file-upload component ships the upstream FilePond PHP server (pqina/filepond-server-p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/icsa-26-280-01</guid>
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