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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 01:55:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-44325 — free5GC: NRF POST /oauth2/token structured-form parser type-confusion panic family (Reflect.Set on incompatible types)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44325</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; free5gc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC&amp;#39;s NRF root SBI endpoint POST /oauth2/token contains a parser-level type-confusion bug family. The handler in NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go reflects over models.NrfAccessTokenAccessTokenReq, special-cases only plain string and NrfNfManagementNfType fields, and treats every other field as if it were a single models.PlmnId. The parsed *models.PlmnId is then assigned with reflect.Value.Set() to whichever field name the attacker put in the form body, which panics whenever the destination field&amp;#39;s real type is incompatible (slice, different struct, primitive). Gin recovery converts each panic into HTTP 500, but the endpoint remains remotely panicable from a single unauthenticated form-encoded request and is repeatedly triggerable. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; free5gc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC&amp;#39;s NRF root SBI endpoint POST /oauth2/token contains a parser-level type-confusion bug family. The handler in NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go reflects over models.NrfAccessTokenAccessTokenReq, special-cases only plain string and NrfNfManagementNfType fields, and treats every other field as if it were a single models.PlmnId. The parsed *models.PlmnId is then assigned with reflect.Value.Set() to whichever field name the attacker put in the form body, which panics whenever the destination field&amp;#39;s real type is incompatible (slice, different struct, primitive). Gin recovery converts each panic into HTTP 500, but the endpoint remains remotely panicable from a single unauthenticated form-encoded request and is repeatedly triggerable. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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