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      <title>GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp — Stored XSS in Rack::Directory via javascript: filenames rendered into anchor href</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-whrj-4476-wvmp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Directory` generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the `javascript:` scheme (e.g. `javascript:alert(1)`), the generated index includes an anchor whose `href` attribute is exactly `javascript:alert(1)`. Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by `Rack::Directory`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Directory` renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```html
&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#39;%s&amp;#39;&amp;gt;%s&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `%s` placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with `javascript:`, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```html
&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#39;javascript:alert(1)&amp;#39;&amp;gt;javascript:alert(1)&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the value is inserted directly into the `href` attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If `Rack::Directory` is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with `javascript:`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application&amp;#39;s origin. Exploitation requires user interaction…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Directory` generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the `javascript:` scheme (e.g. `javascript:alert(1)`), the generated index includes an anchor whose `href` attribute is exactly `javascript:alert(1)`. Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by `Rack::Directory`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Directory` renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```html
&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#39;%s&amp;#39;&amp;gt;%s&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `%s` placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with `javascript:`, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```html
&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#39;javascript:alert(1)&amp;#39;&amp;gt;javascript:alert(1)&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the value is inserted directly into the `href` attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If `Rack::Directory` is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with `javascript:`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application&amp;#39;s origin. Exploitation requires user interaction…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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