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      <title>GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8 — rustls-webpki: Denial of service via panic on malformed CRL BIT STRING</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-82j2-j2ch-gfr8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: rustls-webpki&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`bit_string_flags()` in `src/der.rs` panics with an index-out-of-bounds when given a BIT STRING whose content is exactly `[0x00]` (one byte: zero padding bits, zero data bytes). This is reachable through the public API `BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der()` via the `issuingDistributionPoint` CRL extension.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Precondition**: CRL checking is opt-in in rustls-webpki. This vulnerability affects only applications that explicitly pass `RevocationOptions` to `verify_for_usage()` and load CRL bytes from a source the attacker can influence. The default rustls configuration (no `RevocationOptions`) is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; **AI disclosure**: This report was prepared with AI assistance (Claude). The vulnerability was discovered by differential fuzzing against a formally-verified Rust oracle. All technical claims have been independently verified against the live source code before submission.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`bit_string_flags()` in `src/der.rs` reads the content of named-bit BIT
STRINGs (KeyUsage, ReasonFlags, etc.). Its input guard:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
if padding_bits &amp;gt; 7 || (raw_bits.is_empty() &amp;amp;&amp;amp; padding_bits != 0) {
    return Err(Error::BadDer);
}
let last_byte = raw_bits[raw_bits.len() - 1];  // ← crash
```
misses the case `padding_bits == 0 &amp;amp;&amp;amp; raw_bits.is_empty()`.
When a BIT STRING has content `[0x00]`  (one padding-bits byte set to zero, no data bytes):
- padding_bits = 0x00 — passes the &amp;gt; 7 check ✓
- raw_bits = [] — passes is_empty() &amp;amp;&amp;amp; != 0 check ✓ (because 0 != 0 is false)
- ra…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: rustls-webpki&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`bit_string_flags()` in `src/der.rs` panics with an index-out-of-bounds when given a BIT STRING whose content is exactly `[0x00]` (one byte: zero padding bits, zero data bytes). This is reachable through the public API `BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der()` via the `issuingDistributionPoint` CRL extension.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Precondition**: CRL checking is opt-in in rustls-webpki. This vulnerability affects only applications that explicitly pass `RevocationOptions` to `verify_for_usage()` and load CRL bytes from a source the attacker can influence. The default rustls configuration (no `RevocationOptions`) is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; **AI disclosure**: This report was prepared with AI assistance (Claude). The vulnerability was discovered by differential fuzzing against a formally-verified Rust oracle. All technical claims have been independently verified against the live source code before submission.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`bit_string_flags()` in `src/der.rs` reads the content of named-bit BIT
STRINGs (KeyUsage, ReasonFlags, etc.). Its input guard:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
if padding_bits &amp;gt; 7 || (raw_bits.is_empty() &amp;amp;&amp;amp; padding_bits != 0) {
    return Err(Error::BadDer);
}
let last_byte = raw_bits[raw_bits.len() - 1];  // ← crash
```
misses the case `padding_bits == 0 &amp;amp;&amp;amp; raw_bits.is_empty()`.
When a BIT STRING has content `[0x00]`  (one padding-bits byte set to zero, no data bytes):
- padding_bits = 0x00 — passes the &amp;gt; 7 check ✓
- raw_bits = [] — passes is_empty() &amp;amp;&amp;amp; != 0 check ✓ (because 0 != 0 is false)
- ra…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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