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      <title>GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv — DOMPurify USE_PROFILES prototype pollution allows event handlers</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cj63-jhhr-wcxv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: dompurify&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
When `USE_PROFILES` is enabled, DOMPurify rebuilds `ALLOWED_ATTR` as a plain array before populating it with the requested allowlists. Because the sanitizer still looks up attributes via `ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName]`, any `Array.prototype` property that is polluted also counts as an allowlisted attribute. An attacker who can set `Array.prototype.onclick = true` (or a runtime already subject to prototype pollution) can thus force DOMPurify to keep event handlers such as `onclick` even when they are normally forbidden. The provided PoC sanitizes `&amp;lt;img onclick=...&amp;gt;` with `USE_PROFILES` and adds the sanitized output to the DOM; the polluted prototype allows the event handler to survive and execute, turning what should be a blocklist into a silent XSS vector.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
Prototype pollution makes DOMPurify accept dangerous event handler attributes, which bypasses the sanitizer and results in DOM-based XSS once the sanitized markup is rendered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits
Identified by Cantina’s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: dompurify&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
When `USE_PROFILES` is enabled, DOMPurify rebuilds `ALLOWED_ATTR` as a plain array before populating it with the requested allowlists. Because the sanitizer still looks up attributes via `ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName]`, any `Array.prototype` property that is polluted also counts as an allowlisted attribute. An attacker who can set `Array.prototype.onclick = true` (or a runtime already subject to prototype pollution) can thus force DOMPurify to keep event handlers such as `onclick` even when they are normally forbidden. The provided PoC sanitizes `&amp;lt;img onclick=...&amp;gt;` with `USE_PROFILES` and adds the sanitized output to the DOM; the polluted prototype allows the event handler to survive and execute, turning what should be a blocklist into a silent XSS vector.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
Prototype pollution makes DOMPurify accept dangerous event handler attributes, which bypasses the sanitizer and results in DOM-based XSS once the sanitized markup is rendered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits
Identified by Cantina’s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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