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      <title>GHSA-gj48-438w-jh9v — Bleach clean() / Cleaner() fails to sanitize dangerous URI schemes in allowed formaction attributes</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gj48-438w-jh9v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: bleach&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bleach `clean()` / `Cleaner()` fails to sanitize dangerous URI schemes in allowed `formaction` attributes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bleach applies URI protocol sanitization only to attributes listed in `attr_val_is_uri`. While URI-bearing attributes such as `action`, `href`, `src`, and `poster` are included in that set, `formaction` is not. As a result, if a downstream application explicitly allows `formaction` on submit-capable controls in untrusted HTML, Bleach preserves dangerous values such as `javascript:alert(1)` instead of stripping them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to **submit-triggered JavaScript execution** in applications that rely on Bleach to sanitize untrusted HTML and allow the relevant tag/attribute combination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue appears to be a URI-sanitization coverage gap in Bleach’s sanitizer logic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant code paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* `bleach/sanitizer.py` — `BleachSanitizerFilter.allow_token` (around line 553)
* `bleach/_vendor/html5lib/filters/sanitizer.py` — `attr_val_is_uri` (around line 525)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `BleachSanitizerFilter.allow_token`, URI protocol sanitization is only applied when:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python id=&amp;#34;pft79m&amp;#34;
if namespaced_name in self.attr_val_is_uri:
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, `(None, &amp;#39;formaction&amp;#39;)` is currently missing from `attr_val_is_uri`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This creates an inconsistency where `action` is protocol-sanitized, but `formaction` is not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, if a downstream application allows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* tags such as `&amp;lt;button&amp;gt;` or `&amp;lt;input&amp;gt;`
* the `formaction` attribute&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;then Bleach preserves dangerous URI sch…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: bleach&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bleach `clean()` / `Cleaner()` fails to sanitize dangerous URI schemes in allowed `formaction` attributes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bleach applies URI protocol sanitization only to attributes listed in `attr_val_is_uri`. While URI-bearing attributes such as `action`, `href`, `src`, and `poster` are included in that set, `formaction` is not. As a result, if a downstream application explicitly allows `formaction` on submit-capable controls in untrusted HTML, Bleach preserves dangerous values such as `javascript:alert(1)` instead of stripping them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can lead to **submit-triggered JavaScript execution** in applications that rely on Bleach to sanitize untrusted HTML and allow the relevant tag/attribute combination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue appears to be a URI-sanitization coverage gap in Bleach’s sanitizer logic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant code paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* `bleach/sanitizer.py` — `BleachSanitizerFilter.allow_token` (around line 553)
* `bleach/_vendor/html5lib/filters/sanitizer.py` — `attr_val_is_uri` (around line 525)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `BleachSanitizerFilter.allow_token`, URI protocol sanitization is only applied when:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python id=&amp;#34;pft79m&amp;#34;
if namespaced_name in self.attr_val_is_uri:
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, `(None, &amp;#39;formaction&amp;#39;)` is currently missing from `attr_val_is_uri`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This creates an inconsistency where `action` is protocol-sanitized, but `formaction` is not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, if a downstream application allows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* tags such as `&amp;lt;button&amp;gt;` or `&amp;lt;input&amp;gt;`
* the `formaction` attribute&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;then Bleach preserves dangerous URI sch…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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