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      <title>GHSA-xpg8-3hhp-p7w8 — Temporal Server: attacker-controlled namespace could signal, delete, and reset workflows or activities in a victim name…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xpg8-3hhp-p7w8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: go.temporal.io/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A writer role user in an attacker-controlled namespace could signal, delete, and reset workflows or activities in a victim namespace on the same cluster. Exploitation requires the attacker to know or guess specific victim workflow ID(s) and, for signal operations, signal names. This was due to a bug introduced in Temporal Server v1.29.0 which inadvertently allowed an attacker to control the namespace name value instead of using the server&amp;#39;s own trusted name value within the batch activity code. The batch activity validated the namespace ID but did not cross-check the namespace name against the worker&amp;#39;s bound namespace, allowing the per-namespace worker&amp;#39;s privileged credentials to operate on an arbitrary namespace. Exploitation requires a server configuration where internal components have cross-namespace authorization, such as deployment of the internal-frontend service or equivalent TLS-based authorization for internal identities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability also impacted Temporal Cloud when the attacker and victim namespaces were on the same cell, with the same preconditions as self-hosted clusters.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: go.temporal.io/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A writer role user in an attacker-controlled namespace could signal, delete, and reset workflows or activities in a victim namespace on the same cluster. Exploitation requires the attacker to know or guess specific victim workflow ID(s) and, for signal operations, signal names. This was due to a bug introduced in Temporal Server v1.29.0 which inadvertently allowed an attacker to control the namespace name value instead of using the server&amp;#39;s own trusted name value within the batch activity code. The batch activity validated the namespace ID but did not cross-check the namespace name against the worker&amp;#39;s bound namespace, allowing the per-namespace worker&amp;#39;s privileged credentials to operate on an arbitrary namespace. Exploitation requires a server configuration where internal components have cross-namespace authorization, such as deployment of the internal-frontend service or equivalent TLS-based authorization for internal identities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability also impacted Temporal Cloud when the attacker and victim namespaces were on the same cell, with the same preconditions as self-hosted clusters.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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