https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 06:11:12 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jxpm-75mh-9fp7 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: oras.land/oras-go/v2</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>oras-go follows a registry-controlled `Location` header during the monolithic blob upload flow and reuses the `Authorization` header from the initial `POST` request for the subsequent `PUT` request. If a malicious registry returns a cross-host `Location`, oras-go can send the caller&#39;s credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.</p> <p>## Affected Versions</p> <p>tested: v2.6.0 (commit 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1, as-of 2026-01-24) range: unknown; likely affects earlier v2.x releases that include the same upload flow</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>Credential leak to an attacker-controlled endpoint and client-side ssrf to a cross-host target.</p> <p>## Affected Component</p> <p>- `registry/remote/repository.go:878-916` (`blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost`)</p> <p>## Reproduction</p> <p>Attachments include `poc.zip` with a local-only harness (no real registry required). It runs a fake registry server that returns a cross-host `Location` and a second server that records whether it received `Authorization`.</p> <p>```bash unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp/poc cd /tmp/poc/poc-F-ORAS-LOCATION-UPLOAD-001 make canonical make control ```</p> <p>## Recommended Fix</p> <p>- validate `Location` before uploading (scheme + hostname + effective port) against the original request, or require an explicit opt-in allowlist for cross-host upload urls - never forward `Authorization` when the upload target changes host or scheme</p> <p>## references</p> <p>- security policy: https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/policy - vulnerable code: `reg…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: oras.land/oras-go/v2</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>oras-go follows a registry-controlled `Location` header during the monolithic blob upload flow and reuses the `Authorization` header from the initial `POST` request for the subsequent `PUT` request. If a malicious registry returns a cross-host `Location`, oras-go can send the caller&#39;s credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.</p> <p>## Affected Versions</p> <p>tested: v2.6.0 (commit 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1, as-of 2026-01-24) range: unknown; likely affects earlier v2.x releases that include the same upload flow</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>Credential leak to an attacker-controlled endpoint and client-side ssrf to a cross-host target.</p> <p>## Affected Component</p> <p>- `registry/remote/repository.go:878-916` (`blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost`)</p> <p>## Reproduction</p> <p>Attachments include `poc.zip` with a local-only harness (no real registry required). It runs a fake registry server that returns a cross-host `Location` and a second server that records whether it received `Authorization`.</p> <p>```bash unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp/poc cd /tmp/poc/poc-F-ORAS-LOCATION-UPLOAD-001 make canonical make control ```</p> <p>## Recommended Fix</p> <p>- validate `Location` before uploading (scheme + hostname + effective port) against the original request, or require an explicit opt-in allowlist for cross-host upload urls - never forward `Authorization` when the upload target changes host or scheme</p> <p>## references</p> <p>- security policy: https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/policy - vulnerable code: `reg…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jxpm-75mh-9fp7