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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hq4m-4948-64cc — Kyverno resource with a deletionTimestamp may allow policy circumvention</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hq4m-4948-64cc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/kyverno/kyverno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In versions of Kyverno prior to 1.10.0, resources which have the `deletionTimestamp` field defined can bypass validate, generate, or mutate-existing policies, even in cases where the `validationFailureAction` field is set to `Enforce`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This situation occurs as resources pending deletion were being consciously exempted by Kyverno, as a way to reduce processing load as policies are typically not applied to objects which are being deleted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, this could potentially result in allowing a malicious user to leverage the [Kubernetes finalizers feature](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/working-with-objects/finalizers/) by setting a finalizer which causes the Kubernetes API server to set the `deletionTimestamp` and then not completing the delete operation as a way to explicitly to bypass a Kyverno policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this is not applicable to Kubernetes Pods but, as an example, a Kubernetes Service resource can be manipulated using an indefinite finalizer to bypass policies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
This is resolved in Kyverno 1.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
There is no known workaround.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/kyverno/kyverno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In versions of Kyverno prior to 1.10.0, resources which have the `deletionTimestamp` field defined can bypass validate, generate, or mutate-existing policies, even in cases where the `validationFailureAction` field is set to `Enforce`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This situation occurs as resources pending deletion were being consciously exempted by Kyverno, as a way to reduce processing load as policies are typically not applied to objects which are being deleted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, this could potentially result in allowing a malicious user to leverage the [Kubernetes finalizers feature](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/working-with-objects/finalizers/) by setting a finalizer which causes the Kubernetes API server to set the `deletionTimestamp` and then not completing the delete operation as a way to explicitly to bypass a Kyverno policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this is not applicable to Kubernetes Pods but, as an example, a Kubernetes Service resource can be manipulated using an indefinite finalizer to bypass policies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
This is resolved in Kyverno 1.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
There is no known workaround.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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