https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 20:09:23 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-42472 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> flatpak</p> <p>Flatpak is a Linux application sandboxing and distribution framework. Prior to versions 1.14.0 and 1.15.10, a malicious or compromised Flatpak app using persistent directories could access and write files outside of what it would otherwise have access to, which is an attack on integrity and confidentiality.</p> <p>When `persistent=subdir` is used in the application permissions (represented as `--persist=subdir` in the command-line interface), that means that an application which otherwise doesn&#39;t have access to the real user home directory will see an empty home directory with a writeable subdirectory `subdir`. Behind the scenes, this directory is actually a bind mount and the data is stored in the per-application directory as `~/.var/app/$APPID/subdir`. This allows existing apps that are not aware of the per-application directory to still work as intended without general home directory access.</p> <p>However, the application does have write access to the application directory `~/.var/app/$APPID` where this directory is stored. If the source directory for the `persistent`/`--persist` option is replaced by a symlink, then the next time the application is started, the bind mount will follow the symlink and mount whatever it points to into the sandbox.</p> <p>Partial protection against this vulnerability can be provided by patching Flatpak using the patches in commits ceec2ffc and 98f79773. However, this leaves a race condition that could be exploited by two instances of a malicious app running…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> flatpak</p> <p>Flatpak is a Linux application sandboxing and distribution framework. Prior to versions 1.14.0 and 1.15.10, a malicious or compromised Flatpak app using persistent directories could access and write files outside of what it would otherwise have access to, which is an attack on integrity and confidentiality.</p> <p>When `persistent=subdir` is used in the application permissions (represented as `--persist=subdir` in the command-line interface), that means that an application which otherwise doesn&#39;t have access to the real user home directory will see an empty home directory with a writeable subdirectory `subdir`. Behind the scenes, this directory is actually a bind mount and the data is stored in the per-application directory as `~/.var/app/$APPID/subdir`. This allows existing apps that are not aware of the per-application directory to still work as intended without general home directory access.</p> <p>However, the application does have write access to the application directory `~/.var/app/$APPID` where this directory is stored. If the source directory for the `persistent`/`--persist` option is replaced by a symlink, then the next time the application is started, the bind mount will follow the symlink and mount whatever it points to into the sandbox.</p> <p>Partial protection against this vulnerability can be provided by patching Flatpak using the patches in commits ceec2ffc and 98f79773. However, this leaves a race condition that could be exploited by two instances of a malicious app running…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-42472