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      <title>CVE-2025-61771 — Rack's multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-61771</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. In versions prior to 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2, ``Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS). Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected. Versions 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2 enforce a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB). Workarounds include restricting maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`) and validating and rejecting unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. In versions prior to 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2, ``Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS). Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected. Versions 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2 enforce a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB). Workarounds include restricting maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`) and validating and rejecting unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-61771</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw — Rack: Multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
body = String.new  # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body &amp;lt;&amp;lt; content
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to `params`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* **Upgrade:** Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
* **Workarounds:**
  * Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`).
  * Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
body = String.new  # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body &amp;lt;&amp;lt; content
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to `params`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* **Upgrade:** Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
* **Workarounds:**
  * Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`).
  * Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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