https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 10:05:34 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-40072 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ethereum web3.py</p> <p>web3.py allows you to interact with the Ethereum blockchain using Python. From 6.0.0b3 to before 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2, web3.py implements CCIP Read / OffchainLookup (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in offchain_lookup_payload[&#34;urls&#34;]. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after {sender} / {data} template substitution) without any destination validation. CCIP Read is enabled by default (global_ccip_read_enabled = True on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py&#39;s .call() method is exposed without explicit opt-in. This results in Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs eth_call / .call() against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ethereum web3.py</p> <p>web3.py allows you to interact with the Ethereum blockchain using Python. From 6.0.0b3 to before 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2, web3.py implements CCIP Read / OffchainLookup (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in offchain_lookup_payload[&#34;urls&#34;]. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after {sender} / {data} template substitution) without any destination validation. CCIP Read is enabled by default (global_ccip_read_enabled = True on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py&#39;s .call() method is exposed without explicit opt-in. This results in Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs eth_call / .call() against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-40072 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5hr4-253g-cpx2 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: web3</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>web3.py implements CCIP Read / `OffchainLookup` (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in `offchain_lookup_payload[&#34;urls&#34;]`. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after `{sender}` / `{data}` template substitution) without any destination validation:</p> <p>- No restriction to `https://` (and no opt-in gate for `http://`) - No hostname or IP allowlist - No blocking of private/reserved IP ranges (loopback, link-local, RFC1918) - No redirect target validation (both `requests` and `aiohttp` follow redirects by default)</p> <p>**CCIP Read is enabled by default** (`global_ccip_read_enabled = True` on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py&#39;s `.call()` method is exposed without explicit opt-in.</p> <p>This results in **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs `eth_call` / `.call()` against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Why This Is a Vulnerability</p> <p>The argument is not that CCIP Read itself is invalid or that web3.py should stop supporting EIP-3668. The issue is that, in server-side deployments (backends, indexers, bots, APIs), the current implementation doesn&#39;t provide destination policy controls, such as a validation/override hook, private…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: web3</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>web3.py implements CCIP Read / `OffchainLookup` (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in `offchain_lookup_payload[&#34;urls&#34;]`. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after `{sender}` / `{data}` template substitution) without any destination validation:</p> <p>- No restriction to `https://` (and no opt-in gate for `http://`) - No hostname or IP allowlist - No blocking of private/reserved IP ranges (loopback, link-local, RFC1918) - No redirect target validation (both `requests` and `aiohttp` follow redirects by default)</p> <p>**CCIP Read is enabled by default** (`global_ccip_read_enabled = True` on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py&#39;s `.call()` method is exposed without explicit opt-in.</p> <p>This results in **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs `eth_call` / `.call()` against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Why This Is a Vulnerability</p> <p>The argument is not that CCIP Read itself is invalid or that web3.py should stop supporting EIP-3668. The issue is that, in server-side deployments (backends, indexers, bots, APIs), the current implementation doesn&#39;t provide destination policy controls, such as a validation/override hook, private…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5hr4-253g-cpx2 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3414 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: web3</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>web3.py implements CCIP Read / `OffchainLookup` (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in `offchain_lookup_payload[&#34;urls&#34;]`. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after `{sender}` / `{data}` template substitution) without any destination validation:</p> <p>- No restriction to `https://` (and no opt-in gate for `http://`) - No hostname or IP allowlist - No blocking of private/reserved IP ranges (loopback, link-local, RFC1918) - No redirect target validation (both `requests` and `aiohttp` follow redirects by default)</p> <p>**CCIP Read is enabled by default** (`global_ccip_read_enabled = True` on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py&#39;s `.call()` method is exposed without explicit opt-in.</p> <p>This results in **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs `eth_call` / `.call()` against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Why This Is a Vulnerability</p> <p>The argument is not that CCIP Read itself is invalid or that web3.py should stop supporting EIP-3668. The issue is that, in server-side deployments (backends, indexers, bots, APIs), the current implementation doesn&#39;t provide destination policy controls, such as a validation/override hook, private…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: web3</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>web3.py implements CCIP Read / `OffchainLookup` (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in `offchain_lookup_payload[&#34;urls&#34;]`. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after `{sender}` / `{data}` template substitution) without any destination validation:</p> <p>- No restriction to `https://` (and no opt-in gate for `http://`) - No hostname or IP allowlist - No blocking of private/reserved IP ranges (loopback, link-local, RFC1918) - No redirect target validation (both `requests` and `aiohttp` follow redirects by default)</p> <p>**CCIP Read is enabled by default** (`global_ccip_read_enabled = True` on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py&#39;s `.call()` method is exposed without explicit opt-in.</p> <p>This results in **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs `eth_call` / `.call()` against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Why This Is a Vulnerability</p> <p>The argument is not that CCIP Read itself is invalid or that web3.py should stop supporting EIP-3668. The issue is that, in server-side deployments (backends, indexers, bots, APIs), the current implementation doesn&#39;t provide destination policy controls, such as a validation/override hook, private…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3414