https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:32:01 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-73623 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.54 contains an incomplete denylist in unsafe_git_clone_options that omits --template, allowing attackers to achieve arbitrary command execution during clone operations. Attackers can supply --template pointing to a directory containing malicious post-checkout hooks that execute when git clones the repository.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> gitpython-developers GitPython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.54 contains an incomplete denylist in unsafe_git_clone_options that omits --template, allowing attackers to achieve arbitrary command execution during clone operations. Attackers can supply --template pointing to a directory containing malicious post-checkout hooks that execute when git clones the repository.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-73623 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6p8h-3wgx-97gf <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>## Summary GitPython&#39;s `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=&lt;dir&gt;` copies `&lt;dir&gt;/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.</p> <p>## Root Cause `base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [&#34;--upload-pack&#34;,&#34;-u&#34;,&#34;--config&#34;,&#34;-c&#34;]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `[&#39;--template&#39;]` passes `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes `post-checkout` at checkout time. git&#39;s `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python # attacker stages &lt;dir&gt;/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x) from git import Repo Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template=&#39;&lt;dir&gt;&#39;) # post-checkout hook executes -&gt; marker created (verified) ```</p> <p>## Attack Chain 1. Setup: attacker stages `&lt;dir&gt;/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem). 2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template=&#39;&lt;dir&gt;&#39;)`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=[&#39;--template&#39;], unsafe=unsafe_git_c…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>## Summary GitPython&#39;s `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=&lt;dir&gt;` copies `&lt;dir&gt;/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.</p> <p>## Root Cause `base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [&#34;--upload-pack&#34;,&#34;-u&#34;,&#34;--config&#34;,&#34;-c&#34;]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `[&#39;--template&#39;]` passes `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes `post-checkout` at checkout time. git&#39;s `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.</p> <p>## Impact Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.</p> <p>## Proof of Concept ```python # attacker stages &lt;dir&gt;/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x) from git import Repo Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template=&#39;&lt;dir&gt;&#39;) # post-checkout hook executes -&gt; marker created (verified) ```</p> <p>## Attack Chain 1. Setup: attacker stages `&lt;dir&gt;/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem). 2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template=&#39;&lt;dir&gt;&#39;)`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=[&#39;--template&#39;], unsafe=unsafe_git_c…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6p8h-3wgx-97gf https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3952 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.54 contains an incomplete denylist in unsafe_git_clone_options that omits --template, allowing attackers to achieve arbitrary command execution during clone operations. Attackers can supply --template pointing to a directory containing malicious post-checkout hooks that execute when git clones the repository.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.54 contains an incomplete denylist in unsafe_git_clone_options that omits --template, allowing attackers to achieve arbitrary command execution during clone operations. Attackers can supply --template pointing to a directory containing malicious post-checkout hooks that execute when git clones the repository.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3952