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      <title>GHSA-9mph-4f7v-fmvh — OpenClaw has agent avatar symlink traversal in gateway session metadata</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9mph-4f7v-fmvh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
A crafted local avatar path could follow a symlink outside the agent workspace and return arbitrary file contents as a base64 `data:` URL in gateway responses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
- Confidentiality impact: local file read in the gateway process context.
- Exfiltration path: `agents.list` can return the resulting `avatarUrl` payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Components
- `src/gateway/session-utils.ts` (`resolveIdentityAvatarUrl`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Introduced: `v2026.1.21`
- Affected published versions: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.21-2`
- Planned patched version: `2026.2.22`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Remediation
- Resolve workspace and avatar paths with `realpath` and enforce realpath containment.
- Open files with `O_NOFOLLOW` when available.
- Compare pre-open and opened file identity (`dev`/`ino`) to block swap races.
- Add regression tests for outside-workspace symlink rejection and in-workspace symlink allowance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- `3d0337504349954237d09e4d957df5cb844d5e77`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
A crafted local avatar path could follow a symlink outside the agent workspace and return arbitrary file contents as a base64 `data:` URL in gateway responses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
- Confidentiality impact: local file read in the gateway process context.
- Exfiltration path: `agents.list` can return the resulting `avatarUrl` payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Components
- `src/gateway/session-utils.ts` (`resolveIdentityAvatarUrl`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Introduced: `v2026.1.21`
- Affected published versions: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.21-2`
- Planned patched version: `2026.2.22`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Remediation
- Resolve workspace and avatar paths with `realpath` and enforce realpath containment.
- Open files with `O_NOFOLLOW` when available.
- Compare pre-open and opened file identity (`dev`/`ino`) to block swap races.
- Add regression tests for outside-workspace symlink rejection and in-workspace symlink allowance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- `3d0337504349954237d09e4d957df5cb844d5e77`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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