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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:54:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-44998 — OpenClaw &lt; 2026.4.20 - Tool Policy Bypass via Bundled MCP/LSP Tools</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44998</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 contains a tool policy bypass vulnerability allowing bundled MCP and LSP tools to circumvent configured tool restrictions. Attackers with local agent access can append restricted tools to the effective tool set after policy filtering, bypassing profile policies, allow/deny lists, owner-only restrictions, sandbox policies, and subagent policies.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 contains a tool policy bypass vulnerability allowing bundled MCP and LSP tools to circumvent configured tool restrictions. Attackers with local agent access can append restricted tools to the effective tool set after policy filtering, bypassing profile policies, allow/deny lists, owner-only restrictions, sandbox policies, and subagent policies.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44998</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-qrp5-gfw2-gxv4 — OpenClaw: Bundled MCP/LSP tools could bypass configured tool policy</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qrp5-gfw2-gxv4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected versions: `&amp;lt; 2026.4.20`
- Patched version: `2026.4.20`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bundled MCP and LSP tools could be appended to the agent&amp;#39;s effective tool set after the normal tool-policy pipeline had already filtered core tools. If an operator configured a restrictive policy, such as a tool profile, explicit allow/deny list, owner-only tool restriction, sandbox tool policy, or subagent tool policy, a bundled MCP/LSP tool could remain available even though the same policy would have denied it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue required a configured bundled MCP or LSP tool source and an operator policy that should have restricted that tool. This was a local agent policy-enforcement bypass, not an unauthenticated remote gateway compromise. Severity is medium.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw now applies a final effective tool policy pass to bundled MCP/LSP tools before merging them into the tool set used by normal runs and compaction. The pass covers profile policy, provider profile policy, global/agent/group policies, owner-only filtering, sandbox tool policy, and subagent tool policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `0e7a992d3f3155199c1acc2dd9a53c5b3a4d3ada`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in OpenClaw `2026.4.20`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected versions: `&amp;lt; 2026.4.20`
- Patched version: `2026.4.20`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bundled MCP and LSP tools could be appended to the agent&amp;#39;s effective tool set after the normal tool-policy pipeline had already filtered core tools. If an operator configured a restrictive policy, such as a tool profile, explicit allow/deny list, owner-only tool restriction, sandbox tool policy, or subagent tool policy, a bundled MCP/LSP tool could remain available even though the same policy would have denied it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue required a configured bundled MCP or LSP tool source and an operator policy that should have restricted that tool. This was a local agent policy-enforcement bypass, not an unauthenticated remote gateway compromise. Severity is medium.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw now applies a final effective tool policy pass to bundled MCP/LSP tools before merging them into the tool set used by normal runs and compaction. The pass covers profile policy, provider profile policy, global/agent/group policies, owner-only filtering, sandbox tool policy, and subagent tool policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `0e7a992d3f3155199c1acc2dd9a53c5b3a4d3ada`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in OpenClaw `2026.4.20`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qrp5-gfw2-gxv4</guid>
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