https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 11:41:00 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32026 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.24 contain an improper path validation vulnerability in sandbox media handling that allows absolute paths under the host temporary directory outside the active sandbox root. Attackers can exploit this by providing malicious media references to read and exfiltrate arbitrary files from the host temporary directory through attachment delivery mechanisms.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.24 contain an improper path validation vulnerability in sandbox media handling that allows absolute paths under the host temporary directory outside the active sandbox root. Attackers can exploit this by providing malicious media references to read and exfiltrate arbitrary files from the host temporary directory through attachment delivery mechanisms.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32026 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-33hm-cq8r-wc49 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary Sandbox media local-path validation accepted absolute paths under host tmp, even when those paths were outside the active sandbox root.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version verified during triage: `2026.2.23` - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.2.23` - Patched versions (planned next release): `&gt;= 2026.2.24`</p> <p>### Details In affected versions, sandbox media path resolution allowed absolute host tmp paths as trusted media inputs when they were under `os.tmpdir()`, without requiring that the path stay within the active `sandboxRoot`. Because outbound attachment hydration consumed these paths as already validated, this enabled out-of-sandbox host tmp file reads and exfiltration through attachment delivery.</p> <p>### Impact - Confidentiality impact: high for deployments relying on `sandboxRoot` as a strict local filesystem boundary. - Practical impact: attacker-controlled media references could read and attach host tmp files outside the sandbox workspace boundary.</p> <p>### Remediation - Restrict sandbox tmp-path acceptance to OpenClaw-managed temp roots only. - Default SDK/extension temp helpers to OpenClaw-managed temp roots. - Add CI guardrails to prevent broad tmp-root regressions in messaging/channel code paths.</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `d3da67c7a9b463edc1a9b1c1f7af107a34ca32f5` - `79a7b3d22ef92e36a4031093d80a0acb0d82f351` - `def993dbd843ff28f2b3bad5cc24603874ba9f1e`</p> <p>### Release Process Note The advisory is pre-set with patched ver…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary Sandbox media local-path validation accepted absolute paths under host tmp, even when those paths were outside the active sandbox root.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version verified during triage: `2026.2.23` - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.2.23` - Patched versions (planned next release): `&gt;= 2026.2.24`</p> <p>### Details In affected versions, sandbox media path resolution allowed absolute host tmp paths as trusted media inputs when they were under `os.tmpdir()`, without requiring that the path stay within the active `sandboxRoot`. Because outbound attachment hydration consumed these paths as already validated, this enabled out-of-sandbox host tmp file reads and exfiltration through attachment delivery.</p> <p>### Impact - Confidentiality impact: high for deployments relying on `sandboxRoot` as a strict local filesystem boundary. - Practical impact: attacker-controlled media references could read and attach host tmp files outside the sandbox workspace boundary.</p> <p>### Remediation - Restrict sandbox tmp-path acceptance to OpenClaw-managed temp roots only. - Default SDK/extension temp helpers to OpenClaw-managed temp roots. - Add CI guardrails to prevent broad tmp-root regressions in messaging/channel code paths.</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `d3da67c7a9b463edc1a9b1c1f7af107a34ca32f5` - `79a7b3d22ef92e36a4031093d80a0acb0d82f351` - `def993dbd843ff28f2b3bad5cc24603874ba9f1e`</p> <p>### Release Process Note The advisory is pre-set with patched ver…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-33hm-cq8r-wc49