https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 18:21:11 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32007 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.23 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the experimental apply_patch tool that allows attackers with sandbox access to modify files outside the workspace directory by exploiting inconsistent enforcement of workspace-only checks on mounted paths. Attackers can use apply_patch operations on writable mounts outside the workspace root to access and modify arbitrary files on the system.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.23 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the experimental apply_patch tool that allows attackers with sandbox access to modify files outside the workspace directory by exploiting inconsistent enforcement of workspace-only checks on mounted paths. Attackers can use apply_patch operations on writable mounts outside the workspace root to access and modify arbitrary files on the system.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32007 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h9xm-j4qg-fvpg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary In some opt-in sandbox configurations, the **experimental** `apply_patch` tool did not consistently apply workspace-only checks to mounted paths (for example `/agent/...`).</p> <p>### Impact This does **not** affect default installs.</p> <p>Default posture: - `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=off` (sandbox disabled by default) - `tools.exec.applyPatch.enabled=false` (experimental tool disabled by default)</p> <p>This behavior applies only when all of the following are enabled/configured: - sandbox mode, - experimental `apply_patch`, - workspace-only expectations (`tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true` and/or `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly=true`), - and writable mounts outside workspace.</p> <p>Under that opt-in setup, `apply_patch` operations could target mounted paths outside the workspace root.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected published versions: `&lt;= 2026.2.22-2` - Fixed in code on `main`: commit `6634030be31e1a1842967df046c2f2e47490e6bf` - Patched release: `2026.2.23`</p> <p>### Technical Details In the sandbox path flow, `apply_patch` used `sandbox.bridge.resolvePath(...)` without applying the same workspace-root assertion used by other filesystem tools. The fix makes `apply_patch` follow the same workspace-only enforcement for sandbox-resolved paths (unless explicitly disabled with `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly=false`).</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `6634030be31e1a1842967df046c2f2e47490e6bf`</p> <p>### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the rel…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary In some opt-in sandbox configurations, the **experimental** `apply_patch` tool did not consistently apply workspace-only checks to mounted paths (for example `/agent/...`).</p> <p>### Impact This does **not** affect default installs.</p> <p>Default posture: - `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=off` (sandbox disabled by default) - `tools.exec.applyPatch.enabled=false` (experimental tool disabled by default)</p> <p>This behavior applies only when all of the following are enabled/configured: - sandbox mode, - experimental `apply_patch`, - workspace-only expectations (`tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true` and/or `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly=true`), - and writable mounts outside workspace.</p> <p>Under that opt-in setup, `apply_patch` operations could target mounted paths outside the workspace root.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected published versions: `&lt;= 2026.2.22-2` - Fixed in code on `main`: commit `6634030be31e1a1842967df046c2f2e47490e6bf` - Patched release: `2026.2.23`</p> <p>### Technical Details In the sandbox path flow, `apply_patch` used `sandbox.bridge.resolvePath(...)` without applying the same workspace-root assertion used by other filesystem tools. The fix makes `apply_patch` follow the same workspace-only enforcement for sandbox-resolved paths (unless explicitly disabled with `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly=false`).</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `6634030be31e1a1842967df046c2f2e47490e6bf`</p> <p>### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the rel…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h9xm-j4qg-fvpg