https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 10:24:39 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-22217 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw version 2026.2.22 prior to 2026.2.23 contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in shell-env that allows attackers to execute attacker-controlled binaries by exploiting trusted-prefix fallback logic for the $SHELL variable. An attacker can influence the $SHELL environment variable on systems with writable trusted-prefix directories such as /opt/homebrew/bin to execute arbitrary binaries in the OpenClaw process context.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw version 2026.2.22 prior to 2026.2.23 contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in shell-env that allows attackers to execute attacker-controlled binaries by exploiting trusted-prefix fallback logic for the $SHELL variable. An attacker can influence the $SHELL environment variable on systems with writable trusted-prefix directories such as /opt/homebrew/bin to execute arbitrary binaries in the OpenClaw process context.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-22217 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-p4wh-cr8m-gm6c <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary `shell-env` fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for `$SHELL`, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios.</p> <p>### Details In affected versions, shell selection accepted either: 1. a shell listed in `/etc/shells`, or 2. any executable under hardcoded trusted prefixes (`/bin`, `/usr/bin`, `/usr/local/bin`, `/opt/homebrew/bin`, `/run/current-system/sw/bin`).</p> <p>The selected shell was then executed as a login shell (`-l -c &#39;env -0&#39;`) for PATH/environment probing.</p> <p>On systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under `/opt/homebrew/bin`) and runtime `$SHELL` can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context.</p> <p>The fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in `/etc/shells`; otherwise it falls back to `/bin/sh`.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `&gt;= 2026.2.22, &lt;= 2026.2.22-2` - Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.2.22-2` - Patched versions (released): `&gt;= 2026.2.23`</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55`</p> <p>### Release Process Note This advisory sets `patched_versions` to the released version (`2026.2.23`). This advisory now reflects released fix version `2026.2.23`.</p> <p>OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary `shell-env` fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for `$SHELL`, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios.</p> <p>### Details In affected versions, shell selection accepted either: 1. a shell listed in `/etc/shells`, or 2. any executable under hardcoded trusted prefixes (`/bin`, `/usr/bin`, `/usr/local/bin`, `/opt/homebrew/bin`, `/run/current-system/sw/bin`).</p> <p>The selected shell was then executed as a login shell (`-l -c &#39;env -0&#39;`) for PATH/environment probing.</p> <p>On systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under `/opt/homebrew/bin`) and runtime `$SHELL` can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context.</p> <p>The fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in `/etc/shells`; otherwise it falls back to `/bin/sh`.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `&gt;= 2026.2.22, &lt;= 2026.2.22-2` - Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.2.22-2` - Patched versions (released): `&gt;= 2026.2.23`</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55`</p> <p>### Release Process Note This advisory sets `patched_versions` to the released version (`2026.2.23`). This advisory now reflects released fix version `2026.2.23`.</p> <p>OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-p4wh-cr8m-gm6c