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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 01:14:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-48990 — joserfc: b64=false RFC7797 JWS payloads bypass JWSRegistry payload-size limits during deserialization</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48990</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; authlib joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. In versions 1.3.4 through 1.6.5, joserfc accepts oversized RFC7797 b64=false JWS payloads without applying JWSRegistry.max_payload_length, which can lead to resource exhaustion. The normal JWS compact and flattened JSON paths reject payloads above the configured payload-size limit with ExceededSizeError. The RFC7797 unencoded payload paths do not make the same check. A valid b64=false compact or flattened JSON JWS can therefore deserialize successfully with a payload larger than JWSRegistry.max_payload_length. Applications that accept lower-trust JWS values and rely on joserfc to reject oversized token content during verification have a moderate availability risk. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; authlib joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. In versions 1.3.4 through 1.6.5, joserfc accepts oversized RFC7797 b64=false JWS payloads without applying JWSRegistry.max_payload_length, which can lead to resource exhaustion. The normal JWS compact and flattened JSON paths reject payloads above the configured payload-size limit with ExceededSizeError. The RFC7797 unencoded payload paths do not make the same check. A valid b64=false compact or flattened JSON JWS can therefore deserialize successfully with a payload larger than JWSRegistry.max_payload_length. Applications that accept lower-trust JWS values and rely on joserfc to reject oversized token content during verification have a moderate availability risk. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48990</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wphv-vfrh-23q5 — joserfc: b64=false RFC7797 JWS payloads bypass JWSRegistry payload-size limits during deserialization</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wphv-vfrh-23q5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# RFC7797 b64=false JWS payloads bypass JWSRegistry payload-size limits during deserialization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Testing revealed that `joserfc` accepts oversized RFC7797 `b64=false` JWS payloads without applying `JWSRegistry.max_payload_length`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The normal JWS compact and flattened JSON paths reject payloads above the configured payload-size limit with `ExceededSizeError`. The RFC7797 unencoded payload paths do not make the same check. A valid `b64=false` compact or flattened JSON JWS can therefore deserialize successfully with a payload larger than `JWSRegistry.max_payload_length`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This creates a moderate availability/resource-exhaustion risk for applications that accept lower-trust JWS values and rely on `joserfc` to reject oversized token content during verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Product&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `joserfc`
- Ecosystem: `pip`
- Audited release: `1.6.5`
- Audit tag: `1.6.5`
- Audit commit: `881712980934fb601bed26fe3ae1ec0b7780e6f7`
- Tested affected releases: `1.3.4`, `1.3.5`, `1.4.2`, `1.6.2`, `1.6.3`, `1.6.4`, `1.6.5`
- Fixed release: none known&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `joserfc` 1.6.5, the default JWS registry has `max_payload_length = 128000` and exposes `validate_payload_size()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The normal compact extraction path calls that check before base64url-decoding the payload. The RFC7797 compact path validates the header and signature segment sizes, then assigns the unencoded payload directly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
if is_rfc7797_enabled(protected):
    if not payload_segment and pa…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# RFC7797 b64=false JWS payloads bypass JWSRegistry payload-size limits during deserialization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Testing revealed that `joserfc` accepts oversized RFC7797 `b64=false` JWS payloads without applying `JWSRegistry.max_payload_length`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The normal JWS compact and flattened JSON paths reject payloads above the configured payload-size limit with `ExceededSizeError`. The RFC7797 unencoded payload paths do not make the same check. A valid `b64=false` compact or flattened JSON JWS can therefore deserialize successfully with a payload larger than `JWSRegistry.max_payload_length`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This creates a moderate availability/resource-exhaustion risk for applications that accept lower-trust JWS values and rely on `joserfc` to reject oversized token content during verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Product&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `joserfc`
- Ecosystem: `pip`
- Audited release: `1.6.5`
- Audit tag: `1.6.5`
- Audit commit: `881712980934fb601bed26fe3ae1ec0b7780e6f7`
- Tested affected releases: `1.3.4`, `1.3.5`, `1.4.2`, `1.6.2`, `1.6.3`, `1.6.4`, `1.6.5`
- Fixed release: none known&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `joserfc` 1.6.5, the default JWS registry has `max_payload_length = 128000` and exposes `validate_payload_size()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The normal compact extraction path calls that check before base64url-decoding the payload. The RFC7797 compact path validates the header and signature segment sizes, then assigns the unencoded payload directly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
if is_rfc7797_enabled(protected):
    if not payload_segment and pa…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wphv-vfrh-23q5</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2530 — joserfc: b64=false RFC7797 JWS payloads bypass JWSRegistry payload-size limits during deserialization</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2530</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# RFC7797 b64=false JWS payloads bypass JWSRegistry payload-size limits during deserialization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Testing revealed that `joserfc` accepts oversized RFC7797 `b64=false` JWS payloads without applying `JWSRegistry.max_payload_length`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The normal JWS compact and flattened JSON paths reject payloads above the configured payload-size limit with `ExceededSizeError`. The RFC7797 unencoded payload paths do not make the same check. A valid `b64=false` compact or flattened JSON JWS can therefore deserialize successfully with a payload larger than `JWSRegistry.max_payload_length`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This creates a moderate availability/resource-exhaustion risk for applications that accept lower-trust JWS values and rely on `joserfc` to reject oversized token content during verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Product&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `joserfc`
- Ecosystem: `pip`
- Audited release: `1.6.5`
- Audit tag: `1.6.5`
- Audit commit: `881712980934fb601bed26fe3ae1ec0b7780e6f7`
- Tested affected releases: `1.3.4`, `1.3.5`, `1.4.2`, `1.6.2`, `1.6.3`, `1.6.4`, `1.6.5`
- Fixed release: none known&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `joserfc` 1.6.5, the default JWS registry has `max_payload_length = 128000` and exposes `validate_payload_size()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The normal compact extraction path calls that check before base64url-decoding the payload. The RFC7797 compact path validates the header and signature segment sizes, then assigns the unencoded payload directly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
if is_rfc7797_enabled(protected):
    if not payload_segment and pa…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# RFC7797 b64=false JWS payloads bypass JWSRegistry payload-size limits during deserialization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Testing revealed that `joserfc` accepts oversized RFC7797 `b64=false` JWS payloads without applying `JWSRegistry.max_payload_length`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The normal JWS compact and flattened JSON paths reject payloads above the configured payload-size limit with `ExceededSizeError`. The RFC7797 unencoded payload paths do not make the same check. A valid `b64=false` compact or flattened JSON JWS can therefore deserialize successfully with a payload larger than `JWSRegistry.max_payload_length`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This creates a moderate availability/resource-exhaustion risk for applications that accept lower-trust JWS values and rely on `joserfc` to reject oversized token content during verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Product&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `joserfc`
- Ecosystem: `pip`
- Audited release: `1.6.5`
- Audit tag: `1.6.5`
- Audit commit: `881712980934fb601bed26fe3ae1ec0b7780e6f7`
- Tested affected releases: `1.3.4`, `1.3.5`, `1.4.2`, `1.6.2`, `1.6.3`, `1.6.4`, `1.6.5`
- Fixed release: none known&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `joserfc` 1.6.5, the default JWS registry has `max_payload_length = 128000` and exposes `validate_payload_size()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The normal compact extraction path calls that check before base64url-decoding the payload. The RFC7797 compact path validates the header and signature segment sizes, then assigns the unencoded payload directly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
if is_rfc7797_enabled(protected):
    if not payload_segment and pa…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2530</guid>
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