https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:44:46 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48487 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> python-zeroconf</p> <p>Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.16, _read_character_string and _read_string in src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py advanced self.offset by attacker-declared RDLENGTH without checking it against self._data_len, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to send a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record with rdlength=65535 and seed DNSCache and ServiceInfo.properties with truncated, attacker-shaped key/value or address records. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.16.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> python-zeroconf</p> <p>Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.16, _read_character_string and _read_string in src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py advanced self.offset by attacker-declared RDLENGTH without checking it against self._data_len, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to send a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record with rdlength=65535 and seed DNSCache and ServiceInfo.properties with truncated, attacker-shaped key/value or address records. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.16.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48487 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qc2x-6f54-m6h9 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>`_read_character_string` and `_read_string` in `src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py` sliced `self.data[self.offset : self.offset + length]` and advanced `self.offset` by the declared `length` without checking it against `self._data_len`. Python&#39;s slice silently returns fewer bytes when the end index runs past the buffer, so a record whose 16-bit RDLENGTH (RFC 1035 §3.2.1) over-advertised by tens of kilobytes was constructed from a truncated payload, appended to `DNSIncoming._answers`, and committed to the cache before any later parse failure surfaced. The follow-up `_read_name` for the next record then failed, but the corrupt record had already entered the answer list and propagated to `DNSCache` and `ServiceInfo`.</p> <p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can multicast a single mDNS response carrying a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record that advertises rdlength=65535 and only a handful of real payload bytes; consumers calling `ServiceInfo.properties` then parse the truncated bytes as if they matched the wire, and downstream integrations (Home Assistant and other zeroconf-driven discovery) trust the decoded record. The bug is parser-state desync rather than RCE, but it seeds the cache with attacker-shaped key/value and address records for a TTL window and is a building block for higher-impact chains.</p> <p>The impact is likely lower than the other recently released advisories as there is no additional risk of OOM so the severity was m…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>`_read_character_string` and `_read_string` in `src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py` sliced `self.data[self.offset : self.offset + length]` and advanced `self.offset` by the declared `length` without checking it against `self._data_len`. Python&#39;s slice silently returns fewer bytes when the end index runs past the buffer, so a record whose 16-bit RDLENGTH (RFC 1035 §3.2.1) over-advertised by tens of kilobytes was constructed from a truncated payload, appended to `DNSIncoming._answers`, and committed to the cache before any later parse failure surfaced. The follow-up `_read_name` for the next record then failed, but the corrupt record had already entered the answer list and propagated to `DNSCache` and `ServiceInfo`.</p> <p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can multicast a single mDNS response carrying a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record that advertises rdlength=65535 and only a handful of real payload bytes; consumers calling `ServiceInfo.properties` then parse the truncated bytes as if they matched the wire, and downstream integrations (Home Assistant and other zeroconf-driven discovery) trust the decoded record. The bug is parser-state desync rather than RCE, but it seeds the cache with attacker-shaped key/value and address records for a TTL window and is a building block for higher-impact chains.</p> <p>The impact is likely lower than the other recently released advisories as there is no additional risk of OOM so the severity was m…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qc2x-6f54-m6h9 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3438 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>`_read_character_string` and `_read_string` in `src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py` sliced `self.data[self.offset : self.offset + length]` and advanced `self.offset` by the declared `length` without checking it against `self._data_len`. Python&#39;s slice silently returns fewer bytes when the end index runs past the buffer, so a record whose 16-bit RDLENGTH (RFC 1035 §3.2.1) over-advertised by tens of kilobytes was constructed from a truncated payload, appended to `DNSIncoming._answers`, and committed to the cache before any later parse failure surfaced. The follow-up `_read_name` for the next record then failed, but the corrupt record had already entered the answer list and propagated to `DNSCache` and `ServiceInfo`.</p> <p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can multicast a single mDNS response carrying a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record that advertises rdlength=65535 and only a handful of real payload bytes; consumers calling `ServiceInfo.properties` then parse the truncated bytes as if they matched the wire, and downstream integrations (Home Assistant and other zeroconf-driven discovery) trust the decoded record. The bug is parser-state desync rather than RCE, but it seeds the cache with attacker-shaped key/value and address records for a TTL window and is a building block for higher-impact chains.</p> <p>The impact is likely lower than the other recently released advisories as there is no additional risk of OOM so the severity was m…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>`_read_character_string` and `_read_string` in `src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py` sliced `self.data[self.offset : self.offset + length]` and advanced `self.offset` by the declared `length` without checking it against `self._data_len`. Python&#39;s slice silently returns fewer bytes when the end index runs past the buffer, so a record whose 16-bit RDLENGTH (RFC 1035 §3.2.1) over-advertised by tens of kilobytes was constructed from a truncated payload, appended to `DNSIncoming._answers`, and committed to the cache before any later parse failure surfaced. The follow-up `_read_name` for the next record then failed, but the corrupt record had already entered the answer list and propagated to `DNSCache` and `ServiceInfo`.</p> <p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can multicast a single mDNS response carrying a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record that advertises rdlength=65535 and only a handful of real payload bytes; consumers calling `ServiceInfo.properties` then parse the truncated bytes as if they matched the wire, and downstream integrations (Home Assistant and other zeroconf-driven discovery) trust the decoded record. The bug is parser-state desync rather than RCE, but it seeds the cache with attacker-shaped key/value and address records for a TTL window and is a building block for higher-impact chains.</p> <p>The impact is likely lower than the other recently released advisories as there is no additional risk of OOM so the severity was m…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3438