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CVE-2026-48525 — PyJWT: Unauthenticated DoS via unbounded Base64URL decoding of unused payload segment in b64=false detached JWS

Affected: jpadilla pyjwt

PyJWT is a JSON Web Token implementation in Python. From 2.8.0 to 2.12.1, when verifying detached JWS tokens using the unencoded-payload option ("b64": false, RFC 7797), PyJWT performs Base64URL decoding of the compact-serialization payload segment before enforcing the detached-payload rules. For b64=false, PyJWT later discards that decoded payload and replaces it with the caller-provided detached_payload. In practice, this turns the middle segment into an attacker-controlled “work amplifier”: a remote client can supply an arbitrarily large Base64URL payload segment that forces CPU work + memory allocations even if the signature is invalid. This creates an unauthenticated DoS vector against any endpoint that verifies detached JWS using PyJWT. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13.0.

GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39 — PyJWT: Unauthenticated DoS via unbounded Base64URL decoding of unused payload segment in b64=false detached JWS

Affected: PyPI: pyjwt

> [!NOTE] > Practical impact depends on whether request body-size limits are enforced upstream (proxy/web-server/framework). Deployments with typical body-size caps (≤2 MB) bound the amplifier significantly; deployments accepting larger token inputs are more exposed.

When verifying detached JWS tokens using the unencoded-payload option (`"b64": false`, RFC 7797), PyJWT performs **Base64URL decoding of the compact-serialization payload segment** *before* enforcing the detached-payload rules.

For `b64=false`, PyJWT later **discards** that decoded payload and replaces it with the caller-provided `detached_payload`. In practice, this turns the middle segment into an attacker-controlled “work amplifier”: a remote client can supply an arbitrarily large Base64URL payload segment that forces **CPU work + memory allocations** even if the signature is invalid.

This creates an **unauthenticated DoS** vector against any endpoint that verifies detached JWS using PyJWT.

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## Affected Component(s)

* `jwt/api_jws.py`

* `PyJWS.decode()` / `PyJWS.decode_complete()` * `_load()` (parsing and Base64URL decoding)

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## Root Cause (exact logic flaw)

### What happens in the code

In `jwt/api_jws.py`, `decode_complete()` does the following (order matters):

* Calls `_load(jwt)` first, which decodes the token segments * Only after that, checks `header.get("b64")` and if `False`, it replaces `payload = detached_payload` and rebuilds the signing input

This behavior is visible in `deco…

PYSEC-2026-178

Affected: PyPI: pyjwt