https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 05:34:43 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47734 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> jelmer dulwich</p> <p>Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.1.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, a client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received. Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler - are impacted. The issue is patched in 1.2.5. add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git&#39;s semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size. Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server&#39;s repository config to a sane bound for their environment. On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetches and/or run th…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> jelmer dulwich</p> <p>Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.1.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, a client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received. Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler - are impacted. The issue is patched in 1.2.5. add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git&#39;s semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size. Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server&#39;s repository config to a sane bound for their environment. On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetches and/or run th…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47734 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xrvj-v92f-53gj <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: dulwich</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>An uncontrolled-resource-consumption (memory exhaustion) denial-of-service vulnerability (CWE-400 / CWE-789).</p> <p>A client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received.</p> <p>Who is impacted: Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler.</p> <p>## Patches</p> <p>Patched in 1.2.5.</p> <p>add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git&#39;s semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size.</p> <p>Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server&#39;s repository config to a sane bound for their environment.</p> <p>## Workarounds</p> <p>On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should:</p> <p>- Restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetch…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: dulwich</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>An uncontrolled-resource-consumption (memory exhaustion) denial-of-service vulnerability (CWE-400 / CWE-789).</p> <p>A client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received.</p> <p>Who is impacted: Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler.</p> <p>## Patches</p> <p>Patched in 1.2.5.</p> <p>add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git&#39;s semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size.</p> <p>Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server&#39;s repository config to a sane bound for their environment.</p> <p>## Workarounds</p> <p>On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should:</p> <p>- Restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetch…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xrvj-v92f-53gj https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2466 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: dulwich</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>An uncontrolled-resource-consumption (memory exhaustion) denial-of-service vulnerability (CWE-400 / CWE-789).</p> <p>A client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received.</p> <p>Who is impacted: Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler.</p> <p>## Patches</p> <p>Patched in 1.2.5.</p> <p>add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git&#39;s semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size.</p> <p>Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server&#39;s repository config to a sane bound for their environment.</p> <p>## Workarounds</p> <p>On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should:</p> <p>- Restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetch…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: dulwich</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>An uncontrolled-resource-consumption (memory exhaustion) denial-of-service vulnerability (CWE-400 / CWE-789).</p> <p>A client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received.</p> <p>Who is impacted: Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler.</p> <p>## Patches</p> <p>Patched in 1.2.5.</p> <p>add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git&#39;s semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size.</p> <p>Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server&#39;s repository config to a sane bound for their environment.</p> <p>## Workarounds</p> <p>On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should:</p> <p>- Restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetch…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2466