https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 17:52:06 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53766 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ChromeDevTools chrome-devtools-mcp</p> <p>Chrome DevTools for agents (chrome-devtools-mcp) lets your coding agent control and inspect a live Chrome browser. From 0.24.0 until 1.1.0, McpContext.validatePath() enforces workspace roots by checking whether path.resolve(filePath) textually falls under one of the configured root paths. path.resolve() does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations. This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the roots capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing roots capability allows all paths. The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, upload_file can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ChromeDevTools chrome-devtools-mcp</p> <p>Chrome DevTools for agents (chrome-devtools-mcp) lets your coding agent control and inspect a live Chrome browser. From 0.24.0 until 1.1.0, McpContext.validatePath() enforces workspace roots by checking whether path.resolve(filePath) textually falls under one of the configured root paths. path.resolve() does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations. This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the roots capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing roots capability allows all paths. The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, upload_file can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53766 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8qf9-62x2-82pp <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: chrome-devtools-mcp</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>I originally reported this through Google Bug Hunters. The Google Bug Hunters team said this is in OSS VRP scope but not reward-eligible due to the project tier, and asked me to file an issue or PR directly with this repository. I am reporting it privately here first because it is an unfixed security issue.</p> <p>`McpContext.validatePath()` enforces workspace `roots` by checking whether `path.resolve(filePath)` textually falls under one of the configured root paths. `path.resolve()` does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations.</p> <p>This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the `roots` capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing `roots` capability allows all paths.</p> <p>The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, `upload_file` can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>Affected code:</p> <p>`src/McpContext.ts:178-199`</p> <p>```ts validatePath(filePath?: string): void { if (filePath === undefined) { return; } const roots = this.roots(); if (roots === undefined) { return; } const absolutePath = path.resolve(filePath); for (const root o…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: chrome-devtools-mcp</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>I originally reported this through Google Bug Hunters. The Google Bug Hunters team said this is in OSS VRP scope but not reward-eligible due to the project tier, and asked me to file an issue or PR directly with this repository. I am reporting it privately here first because it is an unfixed security issue.</p> <p>`McpContext.validatePath()` enforces workspace `roots` by checking whether `path.resolve(filePath)` textually falls under one of the configured root paths. `path.resolve()` does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations.</p> <p>This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the `roots` capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing `roots` capability allows all paths.</p> <p>The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, `upload_file` can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>Affected code:</p> <p>`src/McpContext.ts:178-199`</p> <p>```ts validatePath(filePath?: string): void { if (filePath === undefined) { return; } const roots = this.roots(); if (roots === undefined) { return; } const absolutePath = path.resolve(filePath); for (const root o…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8qf9-62x2-82pp