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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:47:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2024-56326 — Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-56326</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pallets jinja&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jinja is an extensible templating engine. Prior to 3.1.5, An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja&amp;#39;s sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don&amp;#39;t escape the sandbox. However, it&amp;#39;s possible to store a reference to a malicious string&amp;#39;s format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pallets jinja&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jinja is an extensible templating engine. Prior to 3.1.5, An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja&amp;#39;s sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don&amp;#39;t escape the sandbox. However, it&amp;#39;s possible to store a reference to a malicious string&amp;#39;s format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-56326</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-q2x7-8rv6-6q7h — Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-q2x7-8rv6-6q7h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jinja2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jinja&amp;#39;s sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don&amp;#39;t escape the sandbox. However, it&amp;#39;s possible to store a reference to a malicious string&amp;#39;s `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jinja2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jinja&amp;#39;s sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don&amp;#39;t escape the sandbox. However, it&amp;#39;s possible to store a reference to a malicious string&amp;#39;s `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-q2x7-8rv6-6q7h</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-1475 — Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-1475</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jinja2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jinja&amp;#39;s sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don&amp;#39;t escape the sandbox. However, it&amp;#39;s possible to store a reference to a malicious string&amp;#39;s `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jinja2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jinja&amp;#39;s sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don&amp;#39;t escape the sandbox. However, it&amp;#39;s possible to store a reference to a malicious string&amp;#39;s `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-1475</guid>
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