<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 04:01:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-80205 — NLTK before 3.10.0 ReDoS via Text.findall() unvalidated regex</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80205</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a regular expression denial of service vulnerability in Text.findall() and TokenSearcher.findall() methods that accept user-supplied regular expressions without validation or timeout. Attackers can supply crafted regex patterns that cause catastrophic backtracking, resulting in indefinite CPU saturation and denial of service to all users of the Python process.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a regular expression denial of service vulnerability in Text.findall() and TokenSearcher.findall() methods that accept user-supplied regular expressions without validation or timeout. Attackers can supply crafted regex patterns that cause catastrophic backtracking, resulting in indefinite CPU saturation and denial of service to all users of the Python process.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80205</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rrv8-h7p8-rx55 — NLTK: ReDoS in nltk.text.Text.findall() via unvalidated user-supplied regular expressions</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rrv8-h7p8-rx55</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
NLTK&amp;#39;s `Text.findall()` and `TokenSearcher.findall()` methods accept user-supplied regular expressions and pass them to the Python `re` engine without timeout or validation, enabling catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS). This issue is isolated to the `nltk.text` module and was resolved in a prior commit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Code
`nltk/text.py` — `TokenSearcher.findall()` (line 255) / `Text.findall()` (line 620)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`TokenSearcher.__init__` builds an internal string by wrapping each token in angle brackets. The `findall()` method preprocesses the caller-supplied regexp and runs it directly against this string with no timeout:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def findall(self, regexp):
    # Preprocessing does NOT prevent catastrophic backtracking
    regexp = re.sub(r&amp;#34;\s&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, regexp)
    regexp = re.sub(r&amp;#34;&amp;lt;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;(?:&amp;lt;(?:&amp;#34;, regexp)
    regexp = re.sub(r&amp;#34;&amp;gt;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;)&amp;gt;)&amp;#34;, regexp)
    regexp = re.sub(r&amp;#34;(?&amp;lt;!\\)\.&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;[^&amp;gt;]&amp;#34;, regexp)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# User-controlled regexp executed with no timeout
    hits = re.findall(regexp, self._raw)
```
The preprocessing transforms `&amp;lt;` and `&amp;gt;` angle-bracket syntax but does not inspect or reject catastrophically backtracking patterns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of Concept
```python
import nltk
import time&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Token of 25 &amp;#39;a&amp;#39; characters produces self._raw = &amp;#34;&amp;lt;aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!&amp;gt;&amp;#34;
# The trailing &amp;#39;!&amp;#39; ensures no match, forcing full backtracking.
text = nltk.Text([&amp;#34;a&amp;#34; * 25 + &amp;#34;!&amp;#34;])&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Pattern after transformation:
#   &amp;lt;  →  (?:&amp;lt;(?:
#   &amp;gt;  →  )&amp;gt;)
# Becomes: (?:&amp;lt;(?:((a+)+)b)&amp;gt;)
# re.findall runs this aga…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
NLTK&amp;#39;s `Text.findall()` and `TokenSearcher.findall()` methods accept user-supplied regular expressions and pass them to the Python `re` engine without timeout or validation, enabling catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS). This issue is isolated to the `nltk.text` module and was resolved in a prior commit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Code
`nltk/text.py` — `TokenSearcher.findall()` (line 255) / `Text.findall()` (line 620)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`TokenSearcher.__init__` builds an internal string by wrapping each token in angle brackets. The `findall()` method preprocesses the caller-supplied regexp and runs it directly against this string with no timeout:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def findall(self, regexp):
    # Preprocessing does NOT prevent catastrophic backtracking
    regexp = re.sub(r&amp;#34;\s&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;, regexp)
    regexp = re.sub(r&amp;#34;&amp;lt;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;(?:&amp;lt;(?:&amp;#34;, regexp)
    regexp = re.sub(r&amp;#34;&amp;gt;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;)&amp;gt;)&amp;#34;, regexp)
    regexp = re.sub(r&amp;#34;(?&amp;lt;!\\)\.&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;[^&amp;gt;]&amp;#34;, regexp)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# User-controlled regexp executed with no timeout
    hits = re.findall(regexp, self._raw)
```
The preprocessing transforms `&amp;lt;` and `&amp;gt;` angle-bracket syntax but does not inspect or reject catastrophically backtracking patterns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of Concept
```python
import nltk
import time&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Token of 25 &amp;#39;a&amp;#39; characters produces self._raw = &amp;#34;&amp;lt;aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!&amp;gt;&amp;#34;
# The trailing &amp;#39;!&amp;#39; ensures no match, forcing full backtracking.
text = nltk.Text([&amp;#34;a&amp;#34; * 25 + &amp;#34;!&amp;#34;])&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Pattern after transformation:
#   &amp;lt;  →  (?:&amp;lt;(?:
#   &amp;gt;  →  )&amp;gt;)
# Becomes: (?:&amp;lt;(?:((a+)+)b)&amp;gt;)
# re.findall runs this aga…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rrv8-h7p8-rx55</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3750</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3750</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a regular expression denial of service vulnerability in Text.findall() and TokenSearcher.findall() methods that accept user-supplied regular expressions without validation or timeout. Attackers can supply crafted regex patterns that cause catastrophic backtracking, resulting in indefinite CPU saturation and denial of service to all users of the Python process.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a regular expression denial of service vulnerability in Text.findall() and TokenSearcher.findall() methods that accept user-supplied regular expressions without validation or timeout. Attackers can supply crafted regex patterns that cause catastrophic backtracking, resulting in indefinite CPU saturation and denial of service to all users of the Python process.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3750</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
