https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 21:39:30 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6hm5-jgcp-p838 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary A path-traversal vulnerability in `NKJPCorpusReader` allows an attacker who can influence the `fileids` argument of its public read methods (`header`, `raw`, `words`, `sents`, `tagged_words`) to read files outside the corpus root. The reader builds the file path with no containment check and opens it with the builtin `open()`, so it bypasses NLTK&#39;s `nltk.pathsec` sandbox — including the strict `ENFORCE = True` mode that `SECURITY.md` recommends for web/multi-tenant deployments. `header()` returns the parsed content of the out-of-root file to the caller (arbitrary file read).</p> <p>### Details `SECURITY.md` promises that file access is &#34;validated against allowed NLTK data directories&#34; and that with `nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE = True` &#34;unauthorized file access … will raise `PermissionError`.&#34; That guarantee is enforced via `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` / `CorpusReader.open()`, which call `nltk.pathsec.validate_path(...)`.</p> <p>`NKJPCorpusReader` never uses that protected path. In `nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py`:</p> <p>- `add_root()` builds the path by **plain string concatenation** with no normalization or containment check: ```python def add_root(self, fileid): # lines 96-102 if self.root in fileid: return fileid # attacker-controlled value returned unchanged return self.root + fileid # plain concat, &#39;..&#39; not stripped ``` - The header view appends a fi…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary A path-traversal vulnerability in `NKJPCorpusReader` allows an attacker who can influence the `fileids` argument of its public read methods (`header`, `raw`, `words`, `sents`, `tagged_words`) to read files outside the corpus root. The reader builds the file path with no containment check and opens it with the builtin `open()`, so it bypasses NLTK&#39;s `nltk.pathsec` sandbox — including the strict `ENFORCE = True` mode that `SECURITY.md` recommends for web/multi-tenant deployments. `header()` returns the parsed content of the out-of-root file to the caller (arbitrary file read).</p> <p>### Details `SECURITY.md` promises that file access is &#34;validated against allowed NLTK data directories&#34; and that with `nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE = True` &#34;unauthorized file access … will raise `PermissionError`.&#34; That guarantee is enforced via `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` / `CorpusReader.open()`, which call `nltk.pathsec.validate_path(...)`.</p> <p>`NKJPCorpusReader` never uses that protected path. In `nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py`:</p> <p>- `add_root()` builds the path by **plain string concatenation** with no normalization or containment check: ```python def add_root(self, fileid): # lines 96-102 if self.root in fileid: return fileid # attacker-controlled value returned unchanged return self.root + fileid # plain concat, &#39;..&#39; not stripped ``` - The header view appends a fi…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6hm5-jgcp-p838 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3581 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary A path-traversal vulnerability in `NKJPCorpusReader` allows an attacker who can influence the `fileids` argument of its public read methods (`header`, `raw`, `words`, `sents`, `tagged_words`) to read files outside the corpus root. The reader builds the file path with no containment check and opens it with the builtin `open()`, so it bypasses NLTK&#39;s `nltk.pathsec` sandbox — including the strict `ENFORCE = True` mode that `SECURITY.md` recommends for web/multi-tenant deployments. `header()` returns the parsed content of the out-of-root file to the caller (arbitrary file read).</p> <p>### Details `SECURITY.md` promises that file access is &#34;validated against allowed NLTK data directories&#34; and that with `nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE = True` &#34;unauthorized file access … will raise `PermissionError`.&#34; That guarantee is enforced via `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` / `CorpusReader.open()`, which call `nltk.pathsec.validate_path(...)`.</p> <p>`NKJPCorpusReader` never uses that protected path. In `nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py`:</p> <p>- `add_root()` builds the path by **plain string concatenation** with no normalization or containment check: ```python def add_root(self, fileid): # lines 96-102 if self.root in fileid: return fileid # attacker-controlled value returned unchanged return self.root + fileid # plain concat, &#39;..&#39; not stripped ``` - The header view appends a fi…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary A path-traversal vulnerability in `NKJPCorpusReader` allows an attacker who can influence the `fileids` argument of its public read methods (`header`, `raw`, `words`, `sents`, `tagged_words`) to read files outside the corpus root. The reader builds the file path with no containment check and opens it with the builtin `open()`, so it bypasses NLTK&#39;s `nltk.pathsec` sandbox — including the strict `ENFORCE = True` mode that `SECURITY.md` recommends for web/multi-tenant deployments. `header()` returns the parsed content of the out-of-root file to the caller (arbitrary file read).</p> <p>### Details `SECURITY.md` promises that file access is &#34;validated against allowed NLTK data directories&#34; and that with `nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE = True` &#34;unauthorized file access … will raise `PermissionError`.&#34; That guarantee is enforced via `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` / `CorpusReader.open()`, which call `nltk.pathsec.validate_path(...)`.</p> <p>`NKJPCorpusReader` never uses that protected path. In `nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py`:</p> <p>- `add_root()` builds the path by **plain string concatenation** with no normalization or containment check: ```python def add_root(self, fileid): # lines 96-102 if self.root in fileid: return fileid # attacker-controlled value returned unchanged return self.root + fileid # plain concat, &#39;..&#39; not stripped ``` - The header view appends a fi…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3581