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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:25:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-97920 — tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-97920</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print_entries() uses n_entries both as the number of sort entries and as
its own return value, so the -ENOMEM it stores when the stats allocation
fails overwrites the count that the cleanup still needs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n_entries = tracing_map_sort_entries(map, ...);
	if (n_entries &amp;lt; 0)
		return n_entries;
	...
			if (!stats) {
				n_entries = -ENOMEM;
				goto out;
			}
	...
 out:
	tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries(sort_entries, n_entries);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries() takes an unsigned int and loops up to
it, so -ENOMEM arrives as 4294967284. It walks an array of at most
map-&amp;gt;max_elts pointers and calls destroy_sort_entry(), which dereferences
and frees, on whatever lies past the end.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reading the hist file of a trigger with a .percent value, with that
allocation forced to fail:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000045000 by task init/1
   tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
   hist_show+0x6f7/0x1df0
   seq_read_iter+0x2b8/0x1190
   vfs_read+0x176/0xa40
  The buggy address belongs to a 4-page vmalloc region starting at
  ffffc90000041000 allocated at tracing_map_sort_entries+0x5c/0xd50&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A few pages further the fault is fatal. The registers at the oops confirm
the bound: the loop&amp;#39;s end pointer less the array start, over the pointer
size, is 4294967284.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ret…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print_entries() uses n_entries both as the number of sort entries and as
its own return value, so the -ENOMEM it stores when the stats allocation
fails overwrites the count that the cleanup still needs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n_entries = tracing_map_sort_entries(map, ...);
	if (n_entries &amp;lt; 0)
		return n_entries;
	...
			if (!stats) {
				n_entries = -ENOMEM;
				goto out;
			}
	...
 out:
	tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries(sort_entries, n_entries);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries() takes an unsigned int and loops up to
it, so -ENOMEM arrives as 4294967284. It walks an array of at most
map-&amp;gt;max_elts pointers and calls destroy_sort_entry(), which dereferences
and frees, on whatever lies past the end.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reading the hist file of a trigger with a .percent value, with that
allocation forced to fail:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000045000 by task init/1
   tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
   hist_show+0x6f7/0x1df0
   seq_read_iter+0x2b8/0x1190
   vfs_read+0x176/0xa40
  The buggy address belongs to a 4-page vmalloc region starting at
  ffffc90000041000 allocated at tracing_map_sort_entries+0x5c/0xd50&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A few pages further the fault is fatal. The registers at the oops confirm
the bound: the loop&amp;#39;s end pointer less the array start, over the pointer
size, is 4294967284.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ret…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-97920</guid>
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