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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:19:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-97413 — RDMA/rtrs-srv: Fix integer underflow in process_read and process_write</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-97413</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rtrs-srv: Fix integer underflow in process_read and process_write&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usr_len is read from a network-supplied message field (le16_to_cpu)
and used to compute data_len = off - usr_len without validating that
usr_len &amp;lt;= off. A malicious RDMA client can send usr_len &amp;gt; off causing
an integer underflow, resulting in data_len wrapping to a huge size_t
value which is then passed to the rdma_ev callback as a memory length,
leading to out-of-bounds memory access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by reading and validating usr_len &amp;lt;= off before rtrs_srv_get_ops_ids()
in both process_read() and process_write(), ensuring the early return
path acquires no reference and has no resource leak.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rtrs-srv: Fix integer underflow in process_read and process_write&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usr_len is read from a network-supplied message field (le16_to_cpu)
and used to compute data_len = off - usr_len without validating that
usr_len &amp;lt;= off. A malicious RDMA client can send usr_len &amp;gt; off causing
an integer underflow, resulting in data_len wrapping to a huge size_t
value which is then passed to the rdma_ev callback as a memory length,
leading to out-of-bounds memory access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by reading and validating usr_len &amp;lt;= off before rtrs_srv_get_ops_ids()
in both process_read() and process_write(), ensuring the early return
path acquires no reference and has no resource leak.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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