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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:59:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-93186 — cxl/mbox: Clamp mailbox output allocation to the payload size</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93186</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cxl/mbox: Clamp mailbox output allocation to the payload size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND bounds the user&amp;#39;s in.size to the mailbox payload
size but leaves out.size unbounded, then cxl_mbox_cmd_ctor() calls
kvzalloc(out.size). A large out.size drives a huge allocation, above
INT_MAX it WARNs and taints, and with panic_on_warn=1 it panics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The transport __cxl_pci_mbox_send_cmd() already clamps the response copy
to min(out.size, payload_size, device len), so the output buffer is
never written beyond payload_size. Clamp the allocation to payload_size
too, matching the RAW path.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cxl/mbox: Clamp mailbox output allocation to the payload size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND bounds the user&amp;#39;s in.size to the mailbox payload
size but leaves out.size unbounded, then cxl_mbox_cmd_ctor() calls
kvzalloc(out.size). A large out.size drives a huge allocation, above
INT_MAX it WARNs and taints, and with panic_on_warn=1 it panics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The transport __cxl_pci_mbox_send_cmd() already clamps the response copy
to min(out.size, payload_size, device len), so the output buffer is
never written beyond payload_size. Clamp the allocation to payload_size
too, matching the RAW path.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93186</guid>
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