<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 07:56:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-93127 — bpf: Drop scalar id on sign-extending narrowing stack fills</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93127</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Drop scalar id on sign-extending narrowing stack fills&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a spilled scalar is filled back with a sign-extending narrowing load
(BPF_MEMSX), check_stack_read_fixed_off() copies the spilled register
including its scalar id, but coerce_reg_to_size_sx() then sign-extends the
filled register&amp;#39;s value. If the same slot is also filled with a plain
zero-extending load (BPF_MEM), both destination registers share the id yet
hold different values. A later &amp;#39;if &amp;lt;zext-reg&amp;gt; == const&amp;#39; then refines the
sign-extended register through sync_linked_regs() to a value it does not
have at runtime (e.g. the verifier believes 0x80000000 while the register
is 0xffffffff80000000), which can be turned into an out-of-bounds access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Drop the shared scalar id at the sign-extension site in check_mem_access()
when sign extension actually changes the value, mirroring the BPF_MOVSX
handling in check_alu_op() (no_sext = reg_umax &amp;lt; 2^(size*8-1)).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Drop scalar id on sign-extending narrowing stack fills&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a spilled scalar is filled back with a sign-extending narrowing load
(BPF_MEMSX), check_stack_read_fixed_off() copies the spilled register
including its scalar id, but coerce_reg_to_size_sx() then sign-extends the
filled register&amp;#39;s value. If the same slot is also filled with a plain
zero-extending load (BPF_MEM), both destination registers share the id yet
hold different values. A later &amp;#39;if &amp;lt;zext-reg&amp;gt; == const&amp;#39; then refines the
sign-extended register through sync_linked_regs() to a value it does not
have at runtime (e.g. the verifier believes 0x80000000 while the register
is 0xffffffff80000000), which can be turned into an out-of-bounds access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Drop the shared scalar id at the sign-extension site in check_mem_access()
when sign extension actually changes the value, mirroring the BPF_MOVSX
handling in check_alu_op() (no_sext = reg_umax &amp;lt; 2^(size*8-1)).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93127</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
